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ERIN R. COLLINS* 
Our criminal justice system promises defendants a fair and just adjudication of 
guilt, regardless of the character of the alleged offense. Yet, from mandatory arrest 
to "no-drop" prosecution policies, the system's front-end response to domestic vio-
lence reflects the belief that it differs from other crimes in ways that permit or 
require the adaptation of criminal justice response mechanisms. Although scholars 
debate whether these differential responses are effective or normatively sound, the 
scholarship leaves untouched the presumption that, once the adjudicatory phase is 
underway, the system treats domestic violence offenses like any other crime. 
This Article reveals that this presumption is false. It demonstrates that many juris-
dictions have adopted specialized evidence rules that authorize admission of highly 
persuasive evidence of guilt in domestic violence prosecutions that would be inad-
missible in other criminal cases. These jurisdictions unmoor evidence rules from 
their justificatory principles to accommodate the same iteration of domestic vio-
lence exceptionalism that underlies specialized front-end criminal justice policies. 
The Article argues that even though such evidentiary manipulation may be effective 
in securing convictions, enlisting different evidence rules in our war on domestic 
violence is unfair to defendants charged with such offenses and undermines the 
integrity of the criminal justice system. It also harms some of the people the system 
seeks to protect by both reducing the efficacy of the criminal justice intervention 
and discrediting those complainants who do not support prosecution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Court cannot alter evidentiary rules merely because litigants 
might prefer different rules in a particular class of cases. 1 
[W]e have treated evidence that illuminates the history of the relation-
ship between an accused and a victim [in a domestic violence prose-
cution] differently . . . . We believe this different treatment is 
appropriate in the context of the accused and the alleged victim of 
domestic abuse. 2 
Although many laud the criminal justice system for treating 
domestic violence the same as all other crimes,3 in fact the strategies 
used to police and prosecute domestic violence are quite different 
from those used in response to other crimes. A report of domestic 
violence triggers a series of unique responses, including mandatory 
arrest and "no-drop" prosecution policies4 and specialized investiga-
tion practices that facilitate prosecution without the complainant's 
support. The purported aim of these differential arrest, investigatory, 
1 United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 322 (1992). 
2 State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004). 
3 See infra note 61. 
4 See infra Part I. 
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and charging practices is to increase the number of domestic violence 
cases that enter the adjudicatory system where domestic violence will 
be treated "like every other case."5 
It was unsurprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court rejected 
the suggestion that it adopt a "special, improvised" Confrontation 
Clause for domestic violence prosecutions in Giles v. California.6 The 
majority specified that legislatures may "combat" domestic violence 
through "many means," but "abridging the constitutional rights of 
criminal defendants is not in the State's arsenal."7 Invoking the rhet-
oric of battle, the Court confirmed that we are at "war" against 
domestic violence, but clarified that there are specific rules of engage-
ment in this war, and compromising defendants' constitutional rights 
violates these rules.s 
Yet, while Giles prohibits the relaxation of constitutional protec-
tions for those accused of domestic violence, the decision authorizes-
and seems to encourage-the relaxation of evidentiary standards in 
such prosecutions. Responding to concerns about the obstacles the 
ruling would erect in domestic violence prosecutions, the Court 
emphasized that the decision's reach was rather limited, since it 
applied "only" to those testimonial statements that implicate the 
Confrontation Clause.9 Nontestimonial statements, such as statements 
to friends or neighbors about "abuse and intimidation" and state-
ments to medical providers, would be excluded "if at all, only by 
hearsay rules," and states remained "free to adopt" less stringent for-
5 See Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An 
Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 552, 611-12 {2007) ("Even when 
procedural reforms like mandatory arrest policies treated domestic violence cases 
differently, it was with the aim of moving the cases into the system where they could be 
judged under the criminal law like every other case."). For a discussion of how mandatory 
arrest and "no-drop" prosecution policies emerged to redress the historical reluctance of 
police and prosecutors to pursue cases involving domestic violence, see LEIGH 
GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
107-13 (2012). 
6 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2007). The issue presented in Giles, a domestic 
homicide prosecution, was whether the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the 
Confrontation Clause required proof that the defendant acted with the intent to prevent 
the witness from testifying. Id. at 355. What was surprising about Giles was the apparent 
willingness of the three dissenting Justices to adapt the Court's Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence to alleviate the practical difficulties in securing convictions in domestic 
violence prosecutions. See id. at 376 {"The dissent closes by pointing out that a forfeiture 
rule which ignores Crawford would be particularly helpful to women in abusive 
relationships-or at least particularly helpful in punishing their abusers."). For further 
discussion, see infra Part II.C. 
7 Giles, 554 U.S. at 376. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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feiture standards for the admission of such hearsay.10 Thus, even after 
Giles, the adoption of targeted, specialized evidence rules aimed at 
securing convictions remains firmly within the arsenal of weapons the 
government may use to fight domestic violence. 
Surprisingly, although domestic violence law and policy has gen-
erated abundant scholarly attention, the question of whether states do 
or should enlist evidentiary doctrine to combat domestic violence 
remains largely undertheorized. Scholars have offered competing nor-
mative arguments about the proper role of the criminal justice system 
in responding to domestic violence11 and the merits of policies that 
encourage or mandate arrest and prosecution of domestic violence 
offenses.12 Some support a criminalization model, which prioritizes a 
strong criminal justice response over other alternatives, and suggest 
that the criminal law should expand further to address domestic vio-
lence.13 Others criticize this model and suggest that the response to 
domestic violence should extend beyond the criminal justice arena, 14 
or bypass it altogether.15 
And yet, while the literature provides diverse perspectives on the 
back-end efficacy of the criminalization model and the propriety of 
the front-end mandatorization of the government's response in service 
of that solution, scholars have paid relatively little attention to what 
10 Id.; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) ("Where nontestimonial 
hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States 
flexibility in their development of hearsay law .... "). 
11 See Hannah Brenner, Transcending the Criminal Law's "One Size Fits All" Response 
to Domestic Violence, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 301, 323-26 (2013) (summarizing 
competing views of criminalization). 
12 Compare GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 118-24 (critiquing mandatory policies for 
depriving complainants of autonomy and agency), with Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: 
Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1849, 1857 (1996) (concluding that the "societal benefits gained" from mandatory policies 
"far outweigh any short-term costs to women's autonomy and collective safety"). For an 
overview of these competing perspectives, see ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED 
WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 184-88 (2000). 
13 See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: 
A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 962 (2004) 
(calling for a "reconceptualization of the crime of domestic violence" that "accurately 
reflects its true nature and harm"). 
14 See, e.g., GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 178-97 (describing a range of possible 
responses to domestic violence "beyond the law" including restorative justice, increased 
economic stability, engagement with abusive men, and community accountability); BETH 
E. RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICA'S PRISON 
NATION 163 (2012) (critiquing the criminalization model for presenting a criminal justice 
response in "isolation from other possible responses" instead of as "part of a menu of 
options for women who are harmed by male violence" and offering alternative responses). 
15 Linda G. Mills, for example, advocates for a restorative justice approach to domestic 
violence. LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OuR RESPONSE TO INTIMATE 
ABUSE 134, 140 (2003). 
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happens in "the middle," specifically whether and to what extent evi-
dence rules are manipulated to support prosecutions of domestic vio-
lence offenses. They largely overlook the process of proof and instead 
focus on how the state should respond to domestic violence.16 
The few scholars who have considered evidentiary doctrine in 
domestic violence prosecutions have universally criticized the applica-
tion of traditional, transsubstantive evidence rules and standards in 
domestic violence prosecutions and advocated for the adoption of spe-
cialized evidence rules that reflect the realities of domestic violence.17 
Emanating from a theoretical perspective that supports the criminal-
ization model, these analyses identify targeted and more permissive 
evidence rules as appropriate, and underutilized, weapons in the war 
against domestic violence.18 
This Article challenges aspects of this conventional wisdom. It 
argues not only that courts and legislatures already manipulate rules 
of evidence in domestic violence prosecutions, but also that in so 
doing they undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system and 
the efficacy of criminal justice intervention. This Article offers a per-
spective largely overlooked in existing literature: critical attention to 
the evidentiary standards used to prosecute male defendants accused 
of domestic violence.19 Taking a broad view of the national eviden-
16 The notable exception to this oversight of trial rules and procedures is the abundant 
attention to the Confrontation Clause in domestic violence prosecutions after Crawford v. 
Washington. E.g., Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747, 
749-55 (2005); Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford's 
Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 311-15 
(2005). 
17 See, e.g., Judith Armatta, Getting Beyond the Law's Complicity in Intimate Violence 
Against Women, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 773, 819 (1997) (arguing that prosecutors "are 
genuinely burdened with evidentiary rules that do not reflect the realities of domestic 
violence" and proposing "broadening the evidentiary standard of relevancy in domestic 
violence cases"); Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence 
and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 366 (1996) 
(proposing to "bridge the gap between following the rules of evidence and serving justice 
for victims of domestic violence" through the adoption of a "specialized evidentiary rule 
for the admissibility of uncharged offenses of domestic violence in domestic violence 
prosecutions"); Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: 
Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL L. REv. 1463, 1516 (1996) (proposing a "[d]omestic 
[v]iolence [h]earsay exception"); Tuerkheimer, supra note 13, at 990 (critiquing evidence 
rules for "mut[ing] stories of battering"). 
18 See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 17, at 1485 (identifying "appropriate evidentiary rules" 
as one of the changes that will "diminish the untold suffering of women and the silent 
victims-their children"); Comment, The Search for the Truth: Admitting Evidence of Prior 
Abuse in Cases of Domestic Violence, 20 U. HAW. L. REv. 221, 223 (1998) (advocating the 
adoption of a "special rule allowing evidence of prior abuse in domestic violence cases" as 
an essential step toward "ending the continuing cycle of domestic violence"). 
l9 By contrast, many have analyzed the development of new evidentiary concepts and 
theories of relevancy to defend women accused of killing their abusive male partners. See, 
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tiary landscape, it identifies evidence rules and standards that have 
been unmoored from their justificatory principles in order to reflect 
prevailing presumptions about domestic violence and the harms that 
result from such consequentialist manipulation.20 Drawing on anti-
essentialist feminist insights, it demonstrates how the manipulation of 
evidence rules works to the detriment of some complainants21 by 
overriding the explanations and experiences of those whose lived real-
ities do not fit within the prevailing narrative of domestic violence or 
do not support the presumption that state-imposed separation is the 
only solution to domestic violence.22 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I recounts the develop-
ment of "domestic violence exceptionalism,"23 or the idea that 
domestic violence is different from other crimes in ways that warrant 
e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 112 ("Legal reform for battered women who kill has 
been one of the most significant areas of feminist lawmaking on domestic violence."); 
Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current 
Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 381-82 (1991) (providing an overview of 
proposed reforms for evidentiary laws in prosecutions of women who killed their abusive 
partners). Although the vast majority of criminal cases are now resolved by plea bargain, 
such bargaining occurs, to some extent, "in the shadow" of the expected trial outcome. See 
generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (developing "shadow of the law" 
bargaining theory). But see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2467 (2004) ("[M]any plea bargains diverge from the shadows of 
trials."). Rules that increase the evidence available to the prosecution can influence both 
the prosecutor's offer and the likelihood the defendant will accept the plea. 
20 This Article identifies trends in evidentiary rules and rulings across state 
jurisdictions. It does not purport to offer a detailed fifty-state survey of evidence rules in 
domestic violence prosecutions. 
21 Choosing terms to describe the parties involved in domestic violence prosecutions is 
an obstacle everyone who writes on the subject must confront, and there are many 
different approaches. See, e.g., GoooMARK, supra note 5, at 199 n.1 (explaining why she 
uses "woman subjected to abuse"); Tuerkheimer, supra note 13, at 960 n.3 (opting to use 
the terms "battered woman" and "victim" to "emphasize the basic proposition that women 
are indeed harmed by battering"). Since this analysis focuses on the prosecution of 
domestic violence offenses, and since most of the case law involves allegations of abuse 
against women by male intimate partners, I generally will use female pronouns and 
"complainant" to identify the person who the state believes has been subjected to domestic 
violence and male pronouns and "defendant" to identify the person accused of such 
violence, underscoring the fact that guilt has not yet been established. Of course, domestic 
violence is not limited to heterosexual relationships, and is not committed only by men 
against women. 
22 Thus, this analysis rejects the neoliberal presumptions that victims and offenders are 
engaged in a "zero-sum policy game ... wherein the offender's gain is the victim's loss, and 
being 'for' victims automatically means being tough on offenders" and "[a]ny untoward 
attention to the rights or welfare of the offender ... detract[s] from the appropriate 
measure of respect for victims." DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME 
AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 11 (2002). 
23 I thank Leigh Goodmark for suggesting the term "domestic violence exceptionalism" 
to describe this phenomenon. 
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specialized criminal justice responses, and its influence in the develop-. 
ment of unique arrest and prosecution policies for domestic violence 
crimes. Part II documents the largely overlooked extension of 
domestic violence exceptionalism into the very standards used to adju-
dicate guilt through an analysis of trends in the interpretation and 
application of the character evidence rule, the medical treatment and 
diagnosis hearsay exception, and the forfeiture by wrongdoing doc-
trine in domestic violence assault prosecutions. Part III demonstrates 
that this specialization of evidentiary doctrine assists the state in 
securing convictions in domestic violence prosecutions by enabling 
admission of otherwise inadmissible-but highly persuasive-evi-
dence of guilt. 
In Part IV, the Article identifies harms that result from manipu-
lating evidence doctrine in domestic violence prosecutions. Such 
manipulation undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system 
and its promise of adjudication under rules that ensure fairness and 
reliability. Furthermore, domestic violence-specific evidence rules also 
harm some of the complainants that they purport to protect. By facili-
tating prosecutions that complainants repudiate, and undermining the 
credibility of complainants whose testimony challenges the prosecu-
tion's theory, such rules reinforce an ineffective and insufficient "one 
size fits all" model of criminalization. Finally, by" undermining defen-
dants' and complainants' sense of procedural fairness, this evidentiary 
manipulation may reduce both the effectiveness of criminal justice 
intervention and the likelihood that complainants will enlist the assis-
tance of the criminal justice system in the future. 
In short, although the evidentiary ·manipulation that occurs in 
domestic violence prosecutions may assist the state in securing convic-
tions, it causes a number of troubling consequences. In other words, 
domestic violence-specific evidence rules cause significant harm even 
when they work.24 
24 I. Bennett Capers recently came to a similar conclusion about rape shield laws. See I. 
Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 832 (2013) ("When rape 
shields do work, they do so at extraordinary cost, reinscribing the very chastity 
requirement that they were intended to abolish."). The manipulation of evidentiary 
doctrine is not unique to domestic violence prosecutions. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 110 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 515, 521-22 (Ct. App. 2010) (noting that "[d]omestic violence is but one of 
the areas in which the rules of evidence have been relaxed in recent years" and identifying 
elder abuse and child abuse as other examples); Myrna S. Raeder, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
Unintended Consequences, and Evidentiary Policy: A Critique and a Rethinking of the 
Application of a Single Set of Evidence Rules to Civil and Criminal Cases, 19 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 1585, 1601-02 (1998) (noting that the "war on drugs ... generates its own share of 
evidentiary reanalysis"). However, this Article _focuses on the particular manipulation that 
occurs in domestic violence prosecutions. 
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I 
THE EMERGENCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
ExcEPTIONALISM 
[Vol. 90:397 
Until shamefully recently, domestic violence was widely treated 
as an issue that did not warrant public acknowledgement, let alone 
intervention. Although a husband's right to subject his wife to cor-
poral punishment had been abrogated by the end of the nineteenth 
century,2s rhetoric of marital privacy and domestic harmony con-
tinued to frame violence against women as a personal matter that did 
not concern the criminal justice system until the 1970s.26 Against this 
backdrop of disavowal of gendered violence, second-wave feminists 
began to call for acknowledgement of and response to domestic vio-
lence.27 Initially, many feminists were skeptical of the efficacy of 
criminalization as a solution to this complex issue, and focused instead 
on creating self-sufficient shelters and supportive services for those 
impacted by domestic violence.28 Eventually, however, they began to 
"engage with the state" and target the criminal justice system as the 
25 See, e.g., Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871) (rejecting the chastisement defense of 
a man accused of assaulting his wife); see also Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife 
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2129 (1996) ("By the 1870s, there 
was no judge or treatise writer in the United States who recognized a husband's 
prerogative to chastise his wife."). This right of "chastisement" was a corollary to the 
doctrine of "marital unity," which dictated that a woman's identity "merged" into her 
husband's upon marriage. Id. at 2122-23. 
26 See Siegel, supra note 25, at 2153-70 (surveying criminal and tort cases that followed 
the formal repudiation of chastisement and demonstrating that courts continued to 
"invoke concepts of privacy to justify giving wife beaters immunity from public and private 
prosecution"); see also JEANNIE SuK, AT HOME IN THE LAw: How THE DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING Pruv ACY 13 (2009) (discussing the historical 
treatment of domestic violence). But see Carolyn B. Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State 
Intervention in the American West and Australia, 1860-1930, 86 IND. L.J. 185, 185-89 
(2011) (challenging the popular assumption that the state failed to respond to domestic 
violence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). 
27 The term "second-wave feminism" encompasses the range of feminist organizing and 
theorizing that occurred "within a temporal time frame, namely the 1960s up until the 
1990s." Aya Gruber, Neofeminism, 50 Hous. L. REv. 1325, 1331 (2013). "Second-wave 
feminis[ts]" were not a monolithic group, and generated "several feminist schools of 
thought, ranging from purely liberal (those dedicated to giving women 'equal' rights to 
men) to extremely radical (those calling for an overhaul of the 'male' legal and social 
structure)." Id. at 1331-32. 
28 See KRISTIN BuMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: How NEOLIBERALISM 
APPROPRIATED THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE 3 (2008) 
(describing the "anti-state" sentiment of early feminist organizing efforts around domestic 
violence); SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND 
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 56-62 (1982) (detailing the 
emergence and growth of the shelter movement); SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 182-83 
(providing a brief overview of the shelter movement). This "anti-state" sentiment was 
reflected in the shelter movement, a grassroots effort to build self-sufficient shelters run by 
and for women who experienced abuse. BuMILLER, supra, at 3. 
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primary site of reform.29 Influenced both by feminist demands for 
criminal justice reform as well as a political climate that was increas-
ingly eager to appear tough on crime, the state responded by declaring 
"war" on domestic violence.3o 
Although, from the outset of this war, the state identified 
domestic violence as a criminal justice problem to be solved with crim-
inal justice solutions,31 it struggled to determine how to treat it rela-
tive to other crimes. Responding initially to early liberal feminist 
demands for "formal equality in prosecutions,''32 the state character-
ized domestic violence as a crime like any other. The Reagan adminis-
tration's 1984 Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence 
Final Report, for example, declared that the government's response to 
"family violence" should be guided "primarily by the nature of the 
abusive act, not the relationship between the victim and the abuser."33 
In other words, there was nothing unique about domestic violence, 
and the state would simply apply established criminal justice policies 
and procedures to this "new" crime. 
It soon became clear that the liberal feminist-influenced "add 
domestic violence and stir"34 approach to the criminalization of 
domestic violence would not suffice; "[a)lthough the law formally 
treated spousal battering like any other criminal assault, . . . [ s )tate 
actors continued to downplay the seriousness of domestic violence 
cases either because of chauvinistic predispositions or because of 
skepticism regarding the prospects of prosecutorial success."35 Due to 
29 SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 182. 
30 See, e.g., Lynne Marek, U.S. Joining War on Domestic Violence, Cm. TRIB. (Mar. 12, 
1994), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/l 994-03-12/news/9403120068_1_ domestic-viol 
ence-shalala-domestic-partner (quoting then-Secretary of Health and Human Services 
Donna Shalala as pledging to "put the federal government back in the fray of fighting such 
'terrorism in the home"'); see also Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 lowA L. 
REv. 741, 798-99 (2007) ("George W. Bush advanced the domestic violence cause by 
declaring 'war' on domestic violence the same way Reagan declared war on drugs."). 
31 See GoooMARK, supra note 5, at 18 (quoting a member of the 1984 Attorney 
General's Task Force on Family Violence who argued: "We believe [domestic violence] is a 
criminal problem and the way to handle it is with criminal justice intervention"). 
32 Gruber, supra note 27, at 1361. 
33 Gruber, supra note 30, at 795 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE FINAL REPORT 4 (1984)). 
34 This is an adaptation of the phrase "add women and stir," which is used as a 
shorthand critique in feminist theory of liberal, rights-based solutions that do not affect 
substantive structural change. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual 
Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1279-80 n.2 (1987) ('"Male-dominated' and 'male-
biased' are the terms usually used by feminists writing within the liberal legal tradition. 
Such terminology is, however, too easily read as implying that 'gender-neutral' institutions 
will result if we merely 'add women and stir' .... "). 
35 Aya Gruber, A "Neo-Feminist" Assessment of Rape and Domestic Violence Law 
Reform, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JusT. 583, 590 (2012). 
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entrenched biases, police and prosecutors remained resistant to 
arresting and prosecuting those accused of domestic violence-related 
crimes. And even when prosecutors pursued charges, they often ran 
into insurmountable evidentiary hurdles because, for a variety of rea-
sons, complainants in domestic violence cases often were reluctant or 
unwilling to participate in those prosecutions that did proceed.36 
Without defendants to prosecute or evidence with which to prosecute 
them, the state could not hope to win its war against domestic 
violence. 
The ascending feminist legal theory of dominance feminism 
assisted the state in resolving this quandary.37 In contrast to liberal 
feminism, which targets differential treatment as the source of 
women's inequality and demands formal equality from the state,38 
dominance feminism identifies women's powerlessness relative to men 
as the cause of their subordination39 and supports state interventions 
that correct this power imbalance.40 According to dominance femi-
nism, domestic violence is one of many practices-like sexual assault, 
sexual harassment, prostitution, and pornography-that reinforce 
male dominance over women.41 
Psychologist Lenore Walker's theories illustrated and essentially 
codified the dominance feminist conception of domestic violence. 
Walker posited that domestic violence occurs in an escalating cycle of 
36 See infra Part IV {discussing various feminist legal scholars' critiques of the 
dominance feminism perspective). It is now widely acknowledged that domestic violence 
complainants decline to participate in prosecutions for many reasons other than fear of 
retaliation from the defendant, including financial reliance, a desire to keep family 
structures intact, distrust of the police, fear of immigration consequences for themselves or 
the defendant, and love. GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 70-75. 
37 Dominance feminism, also known as radical feminism, emanated largely from the 
work of Catharine MacKinnon. GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 10-12. It became the 
"prevailing feminist ideology of the 1980s and 1990s." Id. at 2. "The feminists who fought 
for laws and policies to address domestic violence looked at domestic violence through the 
lens of dominance feminism." Id. at 3. 
38 Gruber, supra note 27, at 1332-33 ("[L)iberal feminism stands for women's formal 
equality within the current social, cultural, political, and legal structure and a commitment 
to women's rights as the vehicle of empowerment."). 
39 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 170-71 (1988) 
("[M)aleness is a form of power and femaleness is a form of powerlessness."). As Leigh 
Goodmark succinctly summarizes, according to dominance feminism "men are actors, 
women acted upon; men are subjects, women are objects." GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 
11. 
40 Gruber, supra note 35, at 592 ("Dominance feminism ... calls for the reversal of the 
gender power structure by utilizing penal law to stamp out instances of sexual 
domination."); see also Gruber, supra note 27, at 1343-44 (noting that dominance 
feminism "sees the key to remedying women's unequal status as reconfiguring power" and 
"unabashedly calls upon the state to authoritatively, even violently, enforce true equality 
by stamping out instances of male sexual domination"). 
41 GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 11. 
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violence that consists of three predictable and distinct phases: tension-
building, acute battering incident, and honeymoon.42 During the 
tension-building phase, the batterer subjects his victim to verbal, emo-
tional, and perhaps minor physical abuse and she, in turn, attempts to 
mollify him to prevent further abuse.43 Tensions continue to build 
until they explode in an acute battering incident in which the batterer 
inflicts serious physical injury upon the victim.44 This is followed by a 
period of contrition, during which the batterer begs for forgiveness 
and promises never to harm the victim again.45 The cycle repeats end-
lessly, with the violence increasing and the period of contrition 
shrinking, until the victim either is killed or leaves the relationship.46 
According to the corollary theory of "learned helplessness," however, 
the latter result is unlikely: As a result of the incessant cycle of vio-
lence, victims of domestic violence come to believe that they are pow-
erless to avoid or prevent future acts of abuse and "[i]nstead of 
actively seeking to escape violent relationships, ... sink into passivity, 
self-blame, and fatalism."47 
Walker eventually expanded her theory into battered woman syn-
drome, which purports to explain the "psychological effects that the 
trauma of battering produces in women."48 This conceptualization of 
domestic violence was initially developed to explain how female 
defendants charged with killing their abusive partners reasonably 
acted in self-defense. Yet, it quickly gained traction beyond the self-
defense arena to become the prevailing explanation for the dynamics 
of domestic violence.49 
Although Walker's theories-and the dominance feminist per-
spective they embody-have been subjected to widespread criticism,50 
this conception of domestic violence was politically palatable and 
42 LENORE E. WALKER, THE BAITERED WOMAN 56-70 (1979). 
43 Id. at 56-59. 
44 Id. at 59-65. 
45 Id. at 65-70. 
46 GoooMARK, supra note 5, at 31-33 (describing Walker's conclusions); see also 
WALKER, supra note 42, at 49-50 (arguing that "[r)epeated batterings ... diminish the 
woman's motivation to respond," causing her to become "passive" and to believe she 
cannot do anything that "will result in a favorable outcome"). 
47 GoooMARK, supra note 5, at 57. 
48 SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 23. 
49 See id. at 23-24 (detailing how battered woman syndrome became a "catch-all 
phrase ... to describe a great range of issues: a woman's prior responses to violence and 
the context in which those responses occurred; the dynamics of the abusive relationship; a 
subcategory of post-traumatic stress disorder; or woman abuse as a larger social problem"). 
50 See infra Part IV (reviewing and analyzing some of the major critiques directed at 
this perspective). 
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highly influential.s1 It provided a universal explanation for a complex 
problem that justified an equally universalized response: strong and 
mandatory state intervention to end the relationship the victim has 
been unable or unwilling to end on her own. Indeed, according to this 
conceptualization of domestic violence, relationships in which 
domestic violence occurred are fundamentally and irreversibly 
broken, and the only solution is to end the relationship before the 
victim is killed. Resistance by the victim to the imposition of this solu-
tion is further evidence of her learned helplessness and underscores 
the need for intervention.s2 Thus, under this narrative, there can be no 
choice about how to respond to domestic violence; each act of vio-
lence is a "prelude to murder"s3 and could present the last chance to 
intervene. 
Viewed through the lens of dominance feminism, then, domestic 
violence is not like any other crime, but rather is a distinctly gendered 
phenomenon that reinforces the subjugation of women. Thus, domi-
nance feminism demands not that the state treat domestic violence the 
same as other crimes, but rather that it take specialized, forceful, and 
affirmative actions to stop domestic violence and correct the gendered 
power imbalance it perpetuates.s4 In other words, according to domi-
nance feminism, domestic violence is an exceptional crime that 
demands an exceptional response. 
Adopting this theory of domestic violence exceptionalism as well 
as its interventionist mandate, individual states responded by 
removing all choice from reluctant state actors.ss First, they targeted 
police inaction by implementing mandatory arrest policies, which 
required police to make at least one arrest in every domestic violence 
51 See GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 3 (recounting the influence of dominance feminist 
theory on domestic violence law and policy). 
52 At least one scholar has suggested that women who resist state intervention should 
be subjected to legal guardianship. Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled 
Battered Women: Breaking the Control of the Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 612 (2000). 
53 SuK, supra note 26, at 36 (under the "paradigm story," domestic violence is a 
"prelude to murder"). 
54 As Goodmark points out, this invocation of state power seems to contradict the 
dominance feminist view that the state is "male jurisprudentially" and that "the law sees 
and treats women the way men see and treat women." GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 11 
(quoting CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
161-62, 163 (1989)). 
55 This merger between feminism and the state to "wield state power together" is an 
example of what Janet Halley has called "Governance Feminism." Karen Engle et al., 
Round Table Discussion: Subversive Legal Moments?, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 197, 224 
(2003); see also JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: How AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK 
FROM FEMINISM 20-22 (2006) (describing Governance Feminism as a movement 
characterized by feminism exerting control over legal, cultural, and familial aspects of 
society by harnessing the power of the state). 
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call.56 A handful of states had adopted mandatory arrest laws by 
1992,57 and those that had not quickly did so to qualify for funding 
under the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).58 States then 
attempted to redress prosecutors' historical reluctance to prosecute 
domestic violence cases by imposing "no-drop" prosecution policies in 
domestic violence cases.59 "No-drop" policies, as their name implies, 
prohibit prosecutors from dismissing viable criminal charges, regard-
less of whether the complainant supports the prosecution and even-
and most controversially-if the complainant wants the state to drop 
the charges. 6o 
Thus, in an attempt to keep its promise to treat domestic violence 
the same as every other crime, the state, guided by dominance femi-
nist legal theory, created a system that responds to it remarkably dif-
ferently.61 From the initial report through the decision whether to 
prosecute, the state's response to domestic violence has been marked 
by a systematic removal of discretion, the factor that guides state 
56 GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 107-10. 
57 See G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and 
the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 Haus. L. REv. 237, 239 n.2 
(2005) ("By 1992, Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah, and 
Wisconsin had passed legislation mandating arrest for domestic violence."). 
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c)(l)(A) (2012) (requiring eligible grantee states to have 
laws or polices that "encourage or mandate arrests of domestic violence offenders based 
on probable cause that an offense has been committed"). For a summary and comparison 
of mandatory arrest laws, see April M. Zeoli, Alexis Norris & Hannah Brenner, A 
Summary and Analysis of Warrantless Arrest Statutes for Domestic Violence in the United 
States, 26 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2811, 2815-25 (2011). 
59 See GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 110-11 (recounting the proliferation of "no-drop" 
prosecution policies); Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of 
Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1505, 1520 n.52 (1998) (identifying 
jurisdictions with "no-drop" prosecution policies). As Jeannie Suk recounts, another 
"crucial step in the criminalization of [domestic violence]" was the emergence of the 
general-purpose civil or family court protection orders, which allow individuals to seek 
protection against their partners directly from the court. SuK, supra note 26, at 14. 
60 Some jurisdictions adopted "hard" no-drop policies, which require prosecutors to 
pursue prosecution at any cost: subpoenaing, arresting, or incarcerating a reluctant 
complainant if necessary to secure her testimony at trial. GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 112. 
Others took a "soft" approach, attempting to overcome complainants' resistance by 
providing supportive services such as courtroom advocates and rides to court. Id. 
61 Michelle Madden Dempsey highlights this contradiction by noting that the calls for 
law enforcement to "take domestic violence seriously" generally entail a demand to both 
implement "no-drop" prosecution policies and to "treat domestic-violence cases similarly 
to cases of generic violence." MICHELLE MADDEN DEMPSEY, PROSECUTING DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 179 (2009); see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 
186 (proponents of mandatory arrest and prosecution policies believe "they send a 
message that domestic violence shall not be treated as a less serious crime than violence 
between strangers"); Miccio, supra note 57, at 240 (concluding that mandatory arrest 
statutes require "the criminal justice system to treat male intimate crimes in a manner 
equivalent to stranger crimes"). 
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actors in every other criminal case and increasingly defines our crim-
inal justice system.62 The purported aim of the targeted, specialized 
response was to increase the number of domestic violence crimes that 
are prosecuted, at which point domestic violence would be treated, 
once again, "like every other case."63 
That the state treats domestic violence differently from other 
crimes is not a new observation, and has drawn abundant scholarly 
attention and debate. Unsurprisingly, those scholars who adopt the 
dominance feminist perspective of domestic violence have supported 
the development of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution poli-
cies64 and pushed for even stronger state interventions aimed at sub-
jecting batterers to criminal punishment and ending relationships in 
which domestic violence occurs.65 In contrast, as will be discussed fur-
ther in Part IV, many others, including anti-essentialist feminist legal 
scholars, have critiqued the dominance feminist perspective for over-
looking the needs and desires of those who do not wish, for a variety 
of reasons, to invoke the punitive power of the state in responding to 
their abusive partner.66 Accordingly, anti-essentialist theorists have 
pushed for the development of extracriminal responses to domestic 
violence that are responsive to the particular needs of those involved. 
And yet, while scholars have offered diverse perspectives on the 
back-end efficacy of criminalization as the solution to this entrenched 
social problem67 and the propriety of the front-end mandatorization 
of the government's response in service of that solution,68 these 
debates largely overlook what happens in "the middle," specifically 
62 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REv. 505, 509 (2001) ("As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and adjudication pass 
into the hands of police and prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law, determine who goes to 
prison and for how long."). In Castle Rock v. Gonzales, however, the Supreme Court 
nevertheless ruled that the "well established tradition of police discretion" continues to 
"coexist[] with apparently mandatory arrest statutes." 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005). 
63 Burke, supra note 5, at 611-12. 
64 See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 12, at 1857 ("The societal benefits gained [from 
mandatory policies] far outweigh any short-term costs to women's autonomy and collective 
safety."); Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA 
WoMEN's L.J. 173, 182 (1997) (arguing in support of "[a]ggressive prosecution of domestic 
violence offenders," because such a policy "rejects the notion that victims should be given 
the choice of whether to press or drop charges"). 
65 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 13, at 962 (calling for a stronger and more specific 
criminal law response to domestic violence). 
66 See, e.g., GooDMARK, supra note 5, at 106-35 (critiquing mandatory policies for 
depriving complainants of autonomy and agency). 
67 See Brenner, supra note 11, at 323-26 (summarizing competing views of 
criminalization). 
68 For an overview of these competing perspectives on mandatory arrest and 
prosecution policies, see SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 184-88. 
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whether the processes used to adjudicate allegations of domestic vio-
lence are or should be guided by the same domestic violence excep-
tionalism that has shaped the state's front-end responses.69 As a 
result, the scholarship leaves relatively untouched the presumption 
that, once the adjudicatory phase is underway, the state's response to 
domestic violence is again guided by liberal, equality-focused 
principles. 
The few scholars who have examined evidentiary doctrine in 
domestic violence prosecutions universally support the creation of 
specialized rules in service of a strong criminalization-focused 
response.70 Emanating from a dominance feminist perspective, these 
analyses largely follow the same syllogistic reasoning enlisted in sup-
port of mandatory arrest and prosecution policies: Domestic violence 
is substantively different from other crimes, and traditional evidence 
rules (like traditional arrest and prosecution policies) do not account 
for these differences, rendering conviction difficult. Given the esca-
lating cycle of violence, if the defendant is not convicted, he will 
assault the complainant again, possibly killing her. In order to secure 
conviction and save the complainant's life, therefore, it is essential 
that the state adapt its evidence rules.71 Characterizing specialized evi-
dence rules as appropriate and necessary weapons in the effort to end 
domestic violence,72 they call for rules that reflect the prevailing, dom-
inance feminist-influenced, iteration of domestic violence exception-
alism embodied by mandatory arrest and prosecution policies. 
As the next section demonstrates, this notion has gained traction 
in some jurisdictions. Courts and legislatures draw on these presump-
tions to conclude that domestic violence is substantively different 
69 As noted above, the widespread scholarly attention to the Confrontation Clause 
after Crawford v. Washington is an exception to this general trend. See supra note 16 and 
accompanying text. 
70 For description of various proposals of scholars to amend evidentiary rules, see 
sources cited supra note 17. One commentator has even suggested that the application of 
the character evidence ban in domestic violence prosecutions amounts to a modern-day 
rule of chastisement and perpetuates "the legal sanction of domestic violence." Andrew 
King-Ries, True to Character: Honoring the Intellectual Foundations of the Character 
Evidence Rule in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 23 ST. Lorns U. PuB. L. REV. 313, 
314-15 (2004). 
71 See King-Ries, supra note 70, at 315 (summarizing the arguments of those who 
advocate for a change in evidentiary law in domestic violence prosecutions as follows: 
"[D]omestic violence is a societal epidemic; domestic violence prosecutions are difficult; 
the particular rule change will make it easier to prosecute domestic violence perpetrators; 
more successful prosecution will reduce the societal epidemic of domestic violence; 
therefore, the law should be changed."). 
72 Myrna S. Raeder, for example, identifies "appropriate evidentiary rules" as one of 
the changes that will "diminish the untold suffering of women and the silent victims-their 
children." Raeder, supra note 17, at 1485. 
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from other crimes, and that this difference requires specialized (and 
more permissive) evidence rules. In so doing, they enlist theories 
developed to be a shield in the defense of women accused of killing 
their abusive partners as a sword with which to justify admission of 
inculpatory evidence against men accused of domestic violence. 
II 
Ev1DENTIARY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ExcEPTIONALISM 
Although the mandatorization of the police and prosecutorial 
response to domestic violence is perhaps an extreme example, it is not 
uncommon for the state to adopt policies aimed at increasing arrests 
for and prosecutions of certain crimes, especially those that are "new" 
or considered particularly socially destructive. The 1980s, for example, 
witnessed a wave of new policies and procedures to target drunk 
driving,73 and more recently legislatures and police departments have 
taken action to "get[] tough on bullying."74 Yet operating in the back-
ground of these tough-on-crime policies is the promise that once a 
defendant enters the criminal justice system he will be afforded a fair 
and just adjudication of guilt, regardless of the strength of society's 
disdain for the offense with which he is charged. 75 
73 See JAMES B. JACOBS, DRUNK DRIVING: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, at xv-xviii (1989) 
(recounting the rise and legislative successes of the anti-drunk driving movement). 
74 Deborah Ahrens, Schools, Cyberbullies, and the Surveillance State, 49 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1669, 1696-97 (2012) (describing recent legislative actions aimed at "getting tough on 
bullying"); see also Jessica R. Key, Getting Tough on Bullying: Can Extreme Measures 
Solve This Issue?, INDIANAPOLIS RECORDER (May 15, 2014), http://www.indianapolisrecor 
der .com/news/prin t_high lights/ article _85b53 fb8-dc6f-11 e3-854b-001 a4bcf887 a.html 
(describing ongoing attempts to criminalize bullying in Carson, California). Of course, 
which crimes are considered worthy of social reprobation can change. Some actions, such 
as domestic violence, can be transformed from a legally sanctioned activity to a serious 
crime. See supra Part I (describing the transformation of how domestic violence is viewed 
in the eyes of the law). Other activity once deemed intractably criminal, such as marijuana 
use, may be decriminalized. See Dan Frosch, Measures to Legalize Marijuana Are Passed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2013, at A18 (describing the legalization of marijuana through ballot 
measures in Colorado, Michigan, and Maine). 
75 For example, despite the widespread debate about the invocation of the "public 
safety" exception to Miranda in the attempt to obtain a statement from Boston Marathon 
bombing suspect Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, commentators invoked as a point of pride that he 
will enjoy a fair trial. See, e.g., Leon Neyfakh, What We Want from the Marathon Bombing 
Trial, Bos. GLOBE (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/04/26/what-
want-from-marathon-bombing-trial/91Hq5V5zcddBlwoFNTK310/story.html ("Subjecting 
Tsarnaev to the particular power of our legal system carries its own symbolic victory ... : 
By treating him the same way we treat everyone we prosecute, we will deny him whatever 
special status he sought in carrying out the attacks."). 
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Evidence rules play a central role in the assurance of a fair and 
impartial trial.76 As a general matter, evidence rules either facilitate 
the adjudicatory process or promote a substantive policy of the law.77 
Most evidence rules fall within the former category and are drafted to 
promote values intrinsic to the adjudicatory process such as efficiency, 
accuracy, and fairness. 78 Significantly, those few that fall in the latter 
category promote substantive policies extrinsic to the subject matter 
of litigation,79 such as encouraging candor between spousess0 or the 
making of settlement offers.81 Whether intrinsically or extrinsically 
oriented, the rules purport to reflect transsubstantive values and poli-
cies that are independent of the particular matter at issue in 
litigation. s2 
76 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) ("These rules ... safeguard 
[defendants] from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty 
and property."). 
77 David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of 
the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1186 (1998). 
78 The Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, must be construed to ensure fairness 
with an eye toward serving dual ends: "ascertaining the truth" and "securing a just 
determination." FED. R. Evm. 102. The Rules also must be read to eliminate expense and 
promote evidence law. Id.; see Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of 
Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 165, 168 (2006) (noting that most evidence rules are 
"(internally) epistemic" and are designed to increase "the accuracy and efficiency of fact 
finding under circumstances of jury decision making"). 
79 See Leonard, supra note 77, at 1187 ("Rules of this type do not primarily serve 
important substantive legal policies or values."); Schauer, supra note 78, at 167-68 (noting 
that some evidence rules are extrinsically oriented and "designed to create the proper 
incentives for socially desirable out-of-court conduct" and do not serve epistemic goals). 
80 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (holding that a spousal privilege 
rule that vests the privilege in the witness-spouse "furthers the important public interest in 
marital harmony without unduly burdening legitimate law enforcement needs"). 
81 See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 408(a)(l) (making inadmissible any evidence of "furnishing, 
promising, or offering-or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept-a 
valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim"). 
82 See David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political Process, 22 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 306 (1995) (arguing that a "key assumption[)" underlying the 
Federal Rules of Evidence is that "the evidence rules, for the most part, should apply the 
same way in different kinds of cases and treat different types of litigants similarly"); J. 
Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth 
Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 551 (1980) ("A basic premise of evidentiary rules is 
that they ... do not develop differently for each substantive crime and civil cause of 
action."); see also Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?-Recent 
American Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law's Subsequent 
Development, 1994 Wrs. L. REv. 1119, 1174 (1994) ("The Federal Rules of Evidence are a 
paradigm of transsubstantive rules that are applicable across the near-entirety of the 
litigation landscape."). Although the transsubstantivity principle has existed since the 
seventeenth century, D. Michael Risinger, Guilt vs. Guiltiness: Are the Right Rules for 
Trying Factual Innocence Inevitably the Wrong Rules for Trying Culpability?, 38 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 885, 886 n.3 (2008), the notion that evidentiary rules should transcend the 
boundary between civil and criminal law has been called into doubt. Raeder, supra note 24, 
at 1587-88. 
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This intrinsic/extrinsic divide promotes the development of evi-
dence rules as outcome-neutral guidelines that ensure a fair and accu-
rate process or encourage certain out-of-court behavior generally, 
regardless of the offense with which the defendant has been charged.83 
As the following discussion demonstrates, however, courts and legisla-
tures in many jurisdictions have blurred this traditional divide 
between intrinsically and extrinsically oriented rules in domestic vio-
lence prosecutions by adopting specialized evidence rules that pro-
mote a substantive policy goal intrinsic to the prosecution: redressing 
the social ill of domestic violence through conviction. Drawing on the 
dominance-feminist informed explanation of domestic violence as cyc-
lical, escalating, incapacitating, and requiring immediate and 
unflinching state intervention, courts and legislatures in these jurisdic-
tions reason that domestic violence is substantively different from 
other crimes, and that this difference requires specialized evidence 
rules. This section demonstrates this phenomenon through the exami-
nation of three trends in domestic violence prosecutions: the admis-
sion of prior acts of domestic violence to prove propensity, the 
expansion of the medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay exception 
to include statements of identification, and the increasing elasticity of 
the forfeiture by wrongdoing standard to admit evidence otherwise 
precluded by the hearsay proscription or the Confrontation Clause. 
These domestic violence-specific rules and standards differ from each 
other in many ways. One has been codified, the others developed in 
common law. Some reflect the explicit rejection of traditional eviden-
tiary principles, others, the implicit conclusion that traditional stan-
dards mean something different in the context of domestic violence. 
What unites these diverse rules and standards is that each is guided 
not by traditional evidentiary principles, but rather tenets of domestic 
violence exceptionalism, and each aims to enable admission of evi-
dence that comports with prevailing presumptions about domestic vio-
lence-and to override that which does not. 
A. Character Evidence Exceptions 
The character evidence rule prohibits prosecutors from intro-
ducing evidence of a defendant's character, including prior crimes or 
bad acts, to demonstrate that he acted in conformity with that char-
83 See Edward K. Cheng, The Perils of Evidentiary Manipulation, 93 VA. L. REV. IN 
BRIEF 207, 211 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/ 
cheng.pdf ("Evidence rules arguably carry special legitimacy because they are--0r are at 
least supposed to be-transsubstantive. Being transsubstantive ensures greater neutrality 
and honesty, because evidentiary doctrines are double-edged swords that can both help 
and hinder substantive objectives."). 
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acter on the date of the charged incident.84 Character evidence is 
excluded not because it is irrelevant, but rather because a fact finder 
may deem it too relevant; "it is said to weigh too much with the jury 
and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general 
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular 
charge."85 The rule thus reflects a fairness-based policy judgment that 
the danger that a fact finder will give undue weight to past bad acts is 
so great that this evidence must be excluded, regardless (or because) 
of its probative value.86 
While the character evidence rule precludes admission of evi-
dence of prior bad acts solely to prove that a defendant has a bad 
character that predisposes him to committing the charged offense, it 
does not proscribe admission of acts that are relevant for a non-
propensity purpose such as motive, intent, knowledge, or lack of mis-
take or accident.87 Nor does it prohibit reference to acts that are so 
"inextricably intertwined" with the charged offense that the prosecu-
tion cannot comprehensibly convey the allegations without refer-
encing them.88 At its heart, the ban on propensity reasoning is rooted 
in a "jealous regard for the liberty of the individual";89 it seeks to 
protect the possibility that a defendant's future is not determined by 
his past, but rather that he retains the free will to break from his past 
and change his behavior. It reflects a belief that even the "most guilty 
criminal may be innocent of other offenses charged against him, of 
which, if fairly tried he might acquit himself."90 Thus, it allows a 
defendant to "start[] his life afresh when he stands before the jury."91 
By preventing the fact finder from convicting a defendant for what he 
has done in the past, the character evidence ban upholds the pillars of 
our criminal justice system: the presumption of innocence and the rea-
84 This rule is codified as FED. R. Evrn. 404, and every state has adopted it. Leonard, 
supra note 77, at 1167. 
85 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948). 
86 Id. ("The overriding policy of excluding [character] evidence, despite its admitted 
probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion 
of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice."). 
87 The leading case on this issue is People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (N.Y. 1901). 
These exceptions are codified in FED. R. Evrn. 404(b )(2). Evidence admitted under any of 
these exceptions, like all other relevant evidence, may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. FED. R. Evrn. 403. 
88 See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Second Coming of Res Gestae: A 
Procedural Approach to Untangling the "Inextricably Intertwined" Theory for Admitting 
Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct, 59 CA'IH. U. L. REv. 719, 726 (2010) 
(discussing the justification for the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine). 
89 Molineux, 61 N.E. at 293. 
90 Molineux, 61 N.E. at 300. 
91 People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930). 
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sonable doubt standard.92 It is so crucial to ensuring a fair and just 
adjudication and "so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence" that it 
assumes "almost constitutional proportions. "93 
It was unsurprising, therefore, that when Congress exempted 
sexual assault and child molestation crimes from the centuries-long 
ban on propensity evidence through the adoption of Federal Rules of 
Evidence 413 and 414,94 the move drew widespread criticism from 
practitioners,95 the American Bar Association,96 evidence scholars,97 
and even some feminist activists and legal theorists.98 Interestingly, 
these Rules were passed as part of the same Act that initially author-
92 See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 361-62 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(citing United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914 (5th Cir. 1978)) ("One of the dangers 
inherent in the admission of extrinsic offense evidence is that the jury may convict the 
defendant not for the offense charged but for the extrinsic offense."); Spencer v. Texas, 385 
U.S. 554, 572-75 (1967) (Warren, J., concurring) ("Evidence of prior convictions has been 
forbidden because it jeopardizes the presumption of innocence of the crime currently 
charged."). The Molineux court stressed that the propensity evidence ban distinguished the 
American common law system-a "product of all the wisdom and humanity of all the 
ages"-from civil law systems in which a defendant's history "is an open book" and 
"[e]very crime or indiscretion of his life may be laid bare to feed the presumption of guilt." 
Molineux, 61 N.E. at 300. 
93 FED. R. Evro. 404 advisory committee's note. Some, including Justice Warren, have 
suggested that violation of this rule offends the Due Process Clause. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 
573-75 (Warren, J., concurring). But see Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the 
False Promise of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1487, 1517-18 (2005) 
(noting that every federal appellate court to consider the constitutionality of FED. R. Evro. 
413-414, which exempt sexual assault offenses from the propensity ban, has held that they 
do not violate due process). 
94 Rules 413 and 414 authorize admission of prior acts of sexual assault and child 
molestation, respectively, for "any matter to which it is relevant" in criminal prosecutions 
for those crimes. FED. R. Evro. 413(a), 414(a). Congress also adopted Rule 415 to 
authorize admission of this evidence in civil proceedings for relief "based on a party's 
alleged sexual assault or child molestation." FED. R. Evro. 415. 
95 E.g., Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 57, 58-59 (1995). 
96 Myrna S. Raeder, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Report to the 
House of Delegates, reprinted in 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 353 (1995) ("Rules 413-415 
are ill designed and raise troubling policy issues."). 
97 E.g., Leonard, supra note 82, at 306 ("These changes do not bode well for the future 
stability of the Federal Rules of Evidence."); Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, 
"Are You Going to Arraign His Whole Life?": How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates 
the Due Process Clause, 28 Lov. U. Cm. L.J. 1, 3 (1996) (arguing that Rules 413 and 414 
violate due process). 
98 See Capers, supra note 24, at 845 n.94 ("[T]he National Organization of Women's 
Legal Defense Fund opposed the rule out of concern that it would diminish basic 
safeguards accorded criminal defendants."). Of course, some feminist scholars supported 
the rules. See, e.g., Karen M. Fingar, And Justice for All: The Admissibility of Uncharged 
Sexual Misconduct Evidence Under the Recent Amendment to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 501, 507-10 (1996) (arguing that FED. R. 
Evro. 413-415 "provide greater justice for victims of sex crimes"). 
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ized VA W A,99 which requires states to adopt mandatory arrest poli-
cies for domestic violence offenses to qualify for federal funding 
under the Act.100 Yet, even then-Senator Joseph Biden, VA W A's pri-
mary sponsor,101 vociferously opposed the adoption of these rules.102 
As the following analysis demonstrates, ma_ny jurisdictions have 
also explicitly or implicitly eviscerated the propensity ban in domestic 
violence prosecutions. A handful of states, taking a cue from Federal 
Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, explicitly authorize the use of propen-
sity reasoning in domestic violence prosecutions.103 Many more do so 
under the guise of a purportedly nonpropensity "domestic violence 
context" theory to demonstrate the "nature of the relationship" 
between the defendant and complainant or to help the jury assess the 
credibility of a recanting complainant.104 Yet, despite the extensive 
scholarly attention to Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414,105 this 
trend in domestic violence prosecutions has developed relatively 
unnoticed. 
1. "Domestic Violence Propensity" Exceptions 
Seven states have amended their evidence rules or adopted stat-
utes to authorize the admission of prior acts of domestic violence in 
domestic violence-related prosecutions.106 Four of these states-
99 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1796 (1994). 
100 See supra Part I (describing requirements that VAWA imposes on states). 
101 See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 35 (1991) (describing the introduction of VAWA). 
102 Senator Biden characterized FED. R. Evm. 413-415 as a "very dangerous 
amendment," 139 CoNG. REC. 27,550 (1993), and said the rules violated "every basic tenet 
of our system." 140 CoNG. REC. 18,930 (1994). 
103 Many jurisdictions also admit prior abusive acts in civil protection order proceedings. 
See Coburn v. Coburn, 674 A.2d 951, 958-59 (Md. Ct. App. 1996) ("In holding that 
evidence of past abuse is relevant in determining the present need for a protective order, 
this Court follows the trend of many jurisdictions."). 
104 See infra notes 133-34 (describing how states authorize propensity reasoning under 
various rationales). 
105 See Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused's Criminal History: The Trouble with 
Rule 404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REv. 201, 251-52 n.342 (2005) (listing articles supporting and 
opposing FED. R. Evm. 413-414). 
106 CAL. Evm. CoDE § 1109 (West 2009) (excepting "evidence ·of the defendant's 
commission of other domestic violence" from the state's ban on character evidence); 
Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-801.5 (West 2014) (authorizing admission of "evidence of 
any other acts of domestic violence between the defendant and the victim named in the 
information, and between the defendant and other persons ... as provided in subsection 
(3) of this section"); 725 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-7.4 (West 2014) ("[E]vidence of the 
defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of domestic violence is admissible, 
and may be considered for its bearing on any matter_ to which it is relevant."); MICH. 
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.27b (West 2014) ("[E]vidence of the defendant's commission of 
other acts of domestic violence is admissible for any purpose for which it is relevant .... "); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.20 (West 2015) ("Evidence of domestic conduct by the accused 
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California, Alaska, Illinois, and Michigan-authorize admission of 
prior acts of domestic violence for any relevant purpose, including to 
establish the defendant's propensity to commit domestic violence. 107 
These domestic violence propensity statutes reflect the same 
theory of domestic violence exceptionalism that underlies mandatory 
arrest and no-drop prosecution policies, particularly its presumptively 
cyclical nature. The Committee on Public Safety Report submitted to 
the California Assembly in support of the state's propensity statute 
concluded, for example, that the "propensity inference" was "particu-
larly appropriate" in domestic violence prosecutions because "on-
going violence and abuse is the norm in domestic violence cases."108 It 
continued, "[n]ot only is there a great likelihood that any one bat-
tering episode is part of a larger scheme of dominance and control, 
that scheme usually escalates in frequency and severity."109 
against the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or household members, is 
admissible [unless overly prejudicial, confusing, or misleading]."); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 565.063(13) (West 2015) ("Evidence of similar criminal convictions of domestic 
violence ... within five years of the offense at issue, shall be admissible for the purposes of 
showing a past history of domestic violence."); ALASKA R. Evm. 404(b)(4) ("In a 
prosecution for a crime involving domestic violence or of interfering with a report of a 
crime involving domestic violence, evidence of other crimes involving domestic violence by 
the defendant against the same or another person ... is admissible."). 
107 CAL. Evm. CooE § 1109; 725 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-7.4; MICH. COMP. LAws 
ANN. § 768.27b; ALASKA R. Evrn. 404(b )( 4). Although the Minnesota statute also 
authorizes admission of evidence of prior domestic abuse subject only to the restriction 
against evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair 
prejudice, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.20, the Minnesota Supreme Court has limited its 
application to the purportedly nonpropensity "relationship" theory of admissibility. See 
State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 2004) (emphasizing the relevance of such 
evidence when it occurred between the victim and defendant). Accordingly, this exception 
will be analyzed as one of the "nonpropensity" domestic violence exception, infra Part 
11.A.2. The Missouri statute restricts admissibility to convictions of domestic violence 
offenses within the preceding five years and authorizes admission to demonstrate "a past 
history of domestic violence." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.063. Though the Missouri Supreme 
Court has not considered this statute, it has ruled that there are "no exceptions" to the rule 
against propensity evidence. State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603, 606 (Mo. 2007) (en bane). 
This statute, therefore, will also be discussed as a "nonpropensity" exception, infra Part 
11.A.2. Colorado courts have interpreted the state statute as requiring that prior acts 
evidence be relevant for a nonpropensity purpose. See, e.g., People v. Raglin, 21 P.3d 419, 
424-25 (Colo. App. 2000), overruled by Fain v. People, 329 P.3d 270, 274 (Colo. 2014) 
(upholding admission of prior acts under CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 18-6-801.5 because the 
trial court implicitly found them relevant for a nonpropensity purpose). 
108 CAL. AssEMB. CoMM. Pus. SAFETY, BILL ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1876, at 3 (1996). 
109 Id. The Colorado legislature similarly found that "domestic violence is frequently 
cyclical in nature, involves patterns of abuse, and can consist of harm with escalating levels 
of seriousness," and declared that "evidence of similar transactions can be helpful and is 
necessary in some situations in prosecuting crimes involving domestic violence." COLO. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-801.5. 
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Similarly, the Illinois statute was created because "domestic vio-
lence is a recurring crime,"110 and a "rationale" proffered for the 
Michigan law was that defendants charged with domestic violence 
offenses "often" had "committed similar acts of abuse in the past."111 
Thus, proponents concluded the "rules of evidence regarding past 
actions ... should not apply in domestic violence cases."112 In other 
words, the cyclical and recurrent nature of domestic violence differen-
tiates it from other crimes, requiring different evidence rules. 
At first blush, this justification for domestic violence propensity 
statutes sounds like a straightforward truth rationale: that propensity 
reasoning should be allowed in domestic violence prosecutions 
because the inference is likely to be true. While perhaps viscerally 
compelling, the truth rationale is doctrinally unsatisfying. The ban on 
propensity reasoning exists not because the propensity inference may 
be false, but rather because the jury may give the inference too much 
weight, convicting based on the strength of the inference instead of 
the strength of the evidence of the defendant's guilt. Thus, even abso-
lute accuracy would not justify an exception to this centuries-old, fair-
ness-based rule. 
In any event, a truth rationale does not fully explain the impetus 
behind the adoption of these statutes. If the statutes were concerned 
simply with admitting evidence to support an inference about the 
defendant's behavioral pattern against the complainant, they would 
only admit evidence of prior acts committed within the context of that 
intimate relationship. Instead, however, they also permit admission of 
past abusive acts against other intimate partners.113 
In the Michigan case of People v. Cameron, for example, the 
defendant was charged with assault and battery against his girl-
110 See People v. Dabbs, 919 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ill. App. 2009) (quoting state 
representative during proceedings to adopt the statute). 
111 MICH. S. FISCAL AGENCY, BILL ANALYSIS OF S.B. 120 & 263, at 1 (2006). 
112 Id. at 3. 
113 The Alaska and Michigan statutes specifically authorize admission of prior acts of 
domestic violence against former partners. See statutes cited supra note 106. The 
California and Illinois statutes simply permit introduction of other offenses of domestic 
violence, and their legislative history and application confirm that they extend to acts 
against former partners. People v. Dabbs, 940 N.E.2d 1088, 1098-99 (Ill. 2010) (reviewing 
legislative history of the Illinois propensity statute and noting that it is intended to 
demonstrate that "the present victim is worthy of belief because her experience is 
corroborated by the experience of another victim of the same abuser") (emphasis added); 
CAL. AssEMB. COMM. Pus. SAFETY, supra note 108, at 5 (discussing California propensity 
statute's intent to admit domestic violence offenses "committed against the victim of the 
charged crime or another similarly situated person"); see also People v. Cabrera, 61 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 373, 381 (Ct. App. 2007) (upholding admission of testimony by two former 
girlfriends about acts of domestic violence under California's domestic violence propensity 
statute). 
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friend. 114 In addition to evidence of six acts of violence the defendant 
had committed against the complainant in the years before the 
charged crime,115 the trial court also admitted, under the state's 
domestic violence propensity statute, the testimony of a woman the 
defendant had dated for a few months-seven years before the 
charged incident-about his violent behavior towards her during their 
relationship.116 The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the trial 
court's ruling that this evidence demonstrated the defendant's "pro-
pensity to commit acts of violence against women who were or had 
been romantically involved with him."117 
As Cameron illustrates, domestic violence propensity statutes 
reflect a presumption not just about the nature of domestic violence, 
but about the nature of domestic violence offenders. They allow the 
fact finder to infer that domestic violence offenders are apt to recidi-
vate not only within a particular relationship, but also in all intimate 
relationships.118 But the statutes are not motivated by a simple judg-
ment that domestic violence offenders exhibit high recidivism rates. 
As Lisa Marie De Sanctis, author of the California propensity 
statute,119 acknowledged, a high recidivism rate was not "the only jus-
tification for using a propensity inference" in domestic violence prose-
cutions.120 Indeed, if increasing the accuracy of fact-finding were the 
only aim of these statutes, their proponents would support the aboli-
tion of the propensity evidence ban for all crimes characterized by a 
high recidivism rate, such as property or drug offenses.121 But instead, 
they suggest the ban is appropriate in other prosecutions.122 
114 806 N.W.2d 371, 372 {Mich. Ct. App. 2011). 
115 Id. at 374-75. 
116 Id. at 375. 
117 Id. at 378. 
118 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d, 515, 524 (Ct. App. 2010) (noting that 
the domestic violence propensity statute reflects a conclusion about the "psychological 
dynamic" of domestic violence that is "not necessarily involved in other types of crimes"). 
119 See De Sanctis, supra note 17, at 361-62 (describing the process of amending Senate 
Bill 1976 to include De Sanctis's proposal). 
120 Id. at 390. 
121 A recent Department of Justice study of state prisoners released in 2005 
demonstrated that 82.l % of property offenders were convicted of a new offense within five 
years of release, compared to 76.9% of drug offenders and 71.3% of violent offenders. 
MATTHEW R. DuRosE ET AL., BUREAU OF JusTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, 
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 
2010, at 9 tbl.10 (2014), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdUrprts05p0510.pdf. 
122 For example, Judith Armatta argues that the character evidence ban is "useful in 
nondomestic violence assault cases to ensure that the defendant is not convicted because 
he has a bad character or reputation," but that its abolition in domestic violence cases is 
necessary to "establish the seriousness of an ongoing pattern of violent behavior." 
Armatta, supra note 17, at 819. However, some who advocate for domestic violence 
propensity exceptions also support the adoption of propensity exceptions for sexual assault 
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At their core, domestic violence propensity statutes reflect a pre-
sumption about the difference between the psychology of domestic 
violence offenders and those who commit other types of crimes. They 
presume not simply that domestic violence offenders often recidivate, 
but that they are unable to refrain from doing so. In other words, their 
past behavior shows that they lack the free will to change their 
behavior.123 From this perspective, it is "[c]ommon sense" not only to 
distinguish domestic violence offenders from other offenders, 124 but 
also to deprive them of the benefit of the "fresh start" before the jury 
that the propensity evidence ban protects.12s 
Understood through this psychological rationale, domestic vio-
lence propensity statutes are concerned not just with holding the 
defendant accountable for his past actions, but also preventing the 
inevitable future violence that will occur if he is not convicted. Propo-
nents of propensity statutes assert that one of the only plausibly effec-
tive interventions that can change a domestic violence offender's 
behavior is the intervention of the criminal justice system.126 Thus, 
they underscore the perceived urgency of interposing the criminal jus-
and child molestation prosecutions. See, e.g., De Sanctis, supra note 17, at 387-88 
(modeling a proposal to create a specialized evidentiary rule for the admissibility of 
uncharged offenses of domestic violence in domestic violence prosecutions on FED. R. 
Evm. 413-414, which accomplish the same for victims of rape and sexual molestation). 
123 This argument was made explicitly in support of sex abuse and child molestation 
propensity statutes, which served as a model for domestic violence propensity statutes. See 
CAL. AssEMB. CoMM. PuB. SAFETY, supra note 108, at 3 (noting that the Bill that became 
California's domestic violence propensity statute was "modeled on" the state's sex offense 
propensity statute). For example, David J. Karp, the author of FED. R. Evm. 413-415, 
contrasted the behaviors of "[o]rdinary people," who "do not commit outrages against 
others because they have relatively little inclination to do so," with a person who has 
committed rape or child molestation, whose past conduct, he argued, "provides evidence 
that he has the combination of aggressive and sexual impulses that motivates the 
commission of such crimes, that he lacks effective inhibitions against acting on these 
impulses, and that the risks involved do not deter him." Evidence of Propensity and 
Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 15, 20 (1994); see 
also Johnson, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 524 n.9 (noting that the legislative history of California's 
sex offense propensity statute "suggests an underlying psychological abnormality that 
makes such evidence especially probative"). De Sanctis heavily relied on Karp's reasoning 
to justify California's domestic violence propensity statute. See De Sanctis, supra note 17, 
at 383-85 (citing Karp's reasoning to describe arguments in favor of FED. R. Evm. 
413-414). 
124 De Sanctis, supra note 17, at 388 ("Common sense suggests that a person with a 
history of beating his intimate partner stands on different ground than does a person 
without that history."). 
12s Contra People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930) (contending the ban on 
propensity reasons that a defendant should "start[ ] his life afresh when he stands before 
the jury"). 
126 CAL AssEMB. CoMM. PuB. SAFETY, supra note 108, at 4 ("[C]riminal prosecution is 
one of the few factors which may interrupt the escalating pattern of domestic violence 
.... "). 
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tice system between the defendant and his partner, thereby breaking 
the "cycle" and preventing future inevitable acts of violence. For 
example, the authors of the California domestic violence propensity 
statute vividly described the perceived stakes of sticking with the 
status quo: "[W]e will continue to see cases where perpetrators of this 
violence will beat their intimate partners, even kill them, and go on to 
beat or kill the next intimate partner."127 From this perspective, 
domestic violence propensity statutes are an appropriate and essential 
"tool for law enforcement and victims"128 in the war against domestic 
violence. 
2. "Domestic Violence Context" Exceptions 
As mentioned above, the character evidence rule does not pro-
hibit the introduction of prior bad acts that are relevant for a non-
propensity purpose, such as establishing motive, intent, or modus 
operandi.129 These malleable and diverse nonpropensity theories of 
admissibility can be and have been used to admit prior acts of abuse in 
many domestic violence prosecutions.130 Nevertheless, legislatures or 
appellate courts in at least ten states have supplemented this list of 
generally applicable theories with a specialized theory that will be 
referred to here as the "domestic violence context" exception.131 
Like domestic violence propensity statutes, the domestic violence 
context exception reflects the presumption that domestic violence 
occurs according to a predictable cycle of violence, that this cyclical 
nature differentiates domestic violence from other crimes, and that 
127 Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added). Tellingly, this statute was originally denominated the 
"Nicole Brown Simpson Law," because "its sponsors were outraged by the exclusion of 
prior acts evidence in the murder trial of O.J. Simpson." Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues 
in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36 IND. L. REv. 687, 701-02 (2003). 
128 People v. Dabbs, 919 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ill. App. 2009). 
129 See supra note 87. David P. Leonard identified these as "theoretically noncharacter" 
purposes, since their application often is difficult to distinguish from character reasoning. 
Leonard, supra note 77, at 1166. 
130 See, e.g., People v. Illgen, 583 N.E.2d 515, 520 (Ill. 1991) ("[E]vidence of the 
defendant's prior unprovoked assaults on his wife tended to negate the likelihood that the 
shooting was an. accident and thereby tended to prove his intent."); State v. Taylor, 689 
N.W.2d 116, 128 (Iowa 2004) (admitting prior acts of abuse to establish motive and intent); 
Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935, 944 (Wyo. 1983) (stating a defendant's prior abuse of victim 
provides "insight into a person's feelings for another which may help establish motive") 
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686 (Wyo. 1995). 
131 "Exception" is perhaps a misnomer, since this is technically not an exception to the 
ban on propensity reasoning, but rather a purportedly nonpropensity theory of 
admissibility. But since this section concludes that it actually is a justification for admitting 
propensity evidence, it will be denominated an exception. 
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this difference justifies admission of prior bad acts.132 But unlike the 
propensity statutes, which eschew the propensity ban altogether, the 
domestic violence context exception purports to uphold the tradi-
tional propensity ban by admitting prior abusive acts for a nonpropen-
sity purpose: contextualizing the alleged behavior. Courts reason that 
evidence admitted under this exception does not demonstrate a defen-
dant's propensity to commit abusive acts, but rather demonstrates the 
"nature of the relationship" within which the charged crime occurred 
(the "relationship rationale")133 or provides information relevant to 
the jury's assessment of the recanting complainant's credibility (the 
"credibility rationale").134 As will be demonstrated below, however, 
132 In analyzing the Minnesota "domestic violence context" exception, for example, the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota reasoned that it was "appropriate" to treat prior acts of 
domestic violence differently from other prior acts evidence because "[d]omestic abuse is 
unique in that it typically occurs in the privacy of the home, it frequently involves a pattern 
of activity that may escalate over time, and it is often underreported." State v. McCoy, 682 
N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004) (citation omitted). 
133 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.063(13) (West 2015) (authorizing admission of prior 
conviction of domestic violence to demonstrate "a past history of domestic violence"); 
Ross v. State, 676 N.E.2d 339, 346 (Ind. 1996) (admitting prior acts of abuse to 
"illuminat[e] the relationship between the defendant and victim"); State v. Green, 652 P.2d 
697, 699, 701 (Kan. 1982) (finding evidence of "marital discord" admissible to demonstrate 
the "relationship between the parties"); McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 159 (interpreting MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 634.20 as authorizing admission of prior acts of abuse to "illuminate[] the ... 
relationship" between the defendant and the complainant and put the alleged crime in "the 
context of [that] relationship"); People v. Shorey, 568 N.Y.S.2d 436, 437 (App. Div. 1991) 
(admitting prior acts evidence "as background material in order for the jury to understand 
the nature of" the abusive relationship); State v. Sanders, 716 A.2d 11, 13 (Vt. 1998) 
(holding evidence of prior instances of abuse was relevant "to portray the history 
surrounding the abusive relationship" and put the allegedly abusive "behavior" in 
"context"). 
134 See State v. Clark, 926 P.2d 194, 207 (Haw. 1996) (finding prior abusive acts 
admissible to show the "context of the relationship," when the relationship is offered as a 
possible explanation for the complainant's recantation); Commonwealth v. Butler, 839 
N.E.2d 307, 313 (Mass. 2005) ("The jury were entitled to consider evidence that depicted 
the hostile relationship between [the victim] and the defendant [in order to help] explain 
her recantation, so that they could adequately assess her credibility .... "); McCoy, 682 
N.W.2d at 161 (authorizing admission of defendant's alleged prior abuse of complainant, 
who testified she could not remember what she told the police about the alleged incident, 
provided the jury with "a context with which it could better judge the credibility of the 
principals in the relationship"); Bigpond v. State, 270 P.3d 1244, 1250 (Nev. 2012) 
("[V]ictim's prior accusations of domestic violence were relevant because they provide 
insight into the relationship and the victim's possible reason for recanting her prior 
accusations, which would assist the jury in adequately assessing the victim's credibility."); 
Sanders, 716 A.2d at 13 (stating that because "[v]ictims of domestic abuse are likely to 
change their stories out of fear of retribution, or even out of misguided affection," 
evidence of prior abuse can elucidate "why the victim is less than candid in her testimony 
and allows [the jury] to decide more accurately which of the victim's statements more 
reliably reflect reality" (citations omitted)); State v. Magers, 189 P.3d 126, 133 (Wash. 
2008) ("(P]rior acts of domestic violence, involving the defendant and the crime victim, are 
admissible in order to assist the jury in judging the credibility of a recanting victim."). 
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each of these rationales in fact requires the fact finder to draw the 
impermissible propensity inference. 
The "relationship rationale" focuses on the presumptively cyclical 
nature of domestic violence. Domestic assaults are, like most crimes, 
transaction-based offenses committed at a certain date and time.135 
Many domestic violence assault defendants are charged under general 
assault statutes;136 others are charged under domestic violence-specific 
assault statutes, which differ from the general statutes only through 
the addition of an element that the assault was committed against an 
intimate partner or family member.137 Nevertheless, courts applying 
the relationship ·rationale look beyond the elements of the crime to 
the prevailing stereotypes about domestic violence to conclude that, in 
order to assess whether a domestic violence defendant committed a 
single assaultive act, the jury must learn whether he has committed 
similar acts in the past. 
For example, in State v. Sanders, the leading Vermont decision 
addressing the domestic violence context exception, the Vermont 
Supreme Court reasoned that prior acts of domestic violence were 
admissible in a prosecution for a single assault because domestic vio-
lence is "controlling behavior aimed at gaining another's compliance 
through multiple. incidents. "138 It concluded that without knowledge of 
the prior abusive acts, the present allegation of abuse would seem 
"incongruous and incredible. "139 Thus, the court ruled that evidence 
of prior acts was properly admitted for the nonpropensity purpose of 
"portray[ing] the history surrounding the abusive relationship," and 
"providing the needed context for the behavior in issue," specifically 
"an understanding of defendant's actions on the date in question."140 
The "credibility rationale," by contrast, focuses on the presump-
tive psychological effects of domestic violence on the complainant. 
135 See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts Ill & IV, 87 
CoLuM. L. REv. 920, 934 (1987) (noting that the system's transaction-based character has 
"deep roots" and that the "very nature of criminal punishment" requires that "[b]efore the 
state can deprive a citizen of liberty in a punitive way," the individual must commit "some 
concrete prohibited act"); Tuerkheimer, supra note 13, at 972 (observing that most 
paradigmatic criminal offenses are "transaction-bound"). While some have criticized the 
limitations of this transaction-based model for failing to reflect the persistent nature of 
battering, see, e.g., id. (criticizing the model for failing to address nonphysical forms of 
abuse that are part of the "full spectrum of battering conduct"), it is the current approach 
the criminal justice system uses, so this Article assesses courts' and legislatures' reasoning 
within that context. 
136 Burke, supra note 5, at 558. 
137 Id. at 561 (citations omitted). 
138 716 A.2d at 13 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
139 Id. (citations omitted). 
140 Id. 
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Courts reason that, as a result of the dynamics of domestic violence 
relationships, complainants are likely to lie to protect their abusive 
partners from punishment, 141 themselves from future harm, and/or 
their relationship.142 Therefore, evidence of prior acts of domestic vio-
lence is essential to the jury's ability to assess the credibility of com-
plainants who have recanted their allegations of abuse. Significantly, 
this rationale is used to undermine the credibility of complainants the 
prosecution calls to testify, despite knowing that they will not inculpate 
the defendant.143 For example, in Commonwealth v. Butler, the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts ruled that absent evidence that the 
defendant had abused the complainant in the years leading up to the 
charged assault, it would have had "difficulty" understanding why the 
complainant-whom the prosecution called as its first witness, despite 
her pre-trial recantation-"was testifying that the defendant had not 
harmed her or behaved criminally."144 Therefore, the jury was "enti-
tled to consider evidence that depicted the hostile relationship 
between [the complainant] and the defendant and helped to explain 
her recantation, so that they could adequately assess her credibility, a 
central issue at trial."145 
Rhetorically, these rationales sound like a variation of the "inex-
tricably intertwined" theory for admitting prior bad acts, under which 
courts will admit prior acts that are so closely related to the charged 
crime that proof of their commission is essential to convey a compre-
hensible narrative to the jury.146 Yet, unlike the inextricably inter-
twined theory, which is limited to prior acts that are so "causally, 
141 See, e.g., State v. Clark, 926 P.2d 194, 206 (Haw. 1996) (crediting prosecution's 
argument that prior abusive acts by the defendant could establish that, as an "individual in 
an abusive relationship," the complainant "could be expected to protect [the defendant] by 
taking blame for the injuries she suffered"). 
142 See, e.g., Sanders, 716 A.2d at 13 (ruling prior acts were admissible and relevant to 
the recanting complainant's credibility because "[v)ictims of domestic abuse are likely to 
change their stories out of fear of retribution, or even out of misguided affection"). 
143 Courts also admit the defendant's prior abusive acts to bolster, explain, or 
rehabilitate the credibility of complainants whose credibility has been undermined by 
defense cross-examination. See, e.g., State v. Laprade, 958 A.2d 1179, 1182-83 (Vt. 2008) 
(allowing evidence of prior abusive acts, noting complainant changed her story about 
instant abusive acts). 
144 Commonwealth v. Butler, 839 N.E.2d 307, 312-13 (Mass. 2005). 
145 Id. at 313. 
146 Imwinkelried, supra note 88, at 725. Minnesota, for example, calls this "immediate-
episode evidence," and admits prior bad acts under this theory when there is a close causal 
and temporal link between the prior act and the charged crime "so that one cannot be fully 
shown without proving the other, or where evidence of other crimes constitutes part of the 
res gestae." State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 425 (Minn. 2009) (citations omitted). 
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temporally, or spatially"147 related to the charged act that they are 
"linguistically inseparable" therefrom,14s courts use the context excep-
tion to admit acts of domestic violence that occurred months149 or 
years150 before the charged incident, and even against intimate part-
ners other than the complainant.151 In essence, courts conclude that 
the prior acts are conceptually inseparable from the charged incident. 
Given the presumptively unique nature of domestic violence, jurors 
are thought to be unable' to comprehend the charges or the com-
plainant's recantation without knowing that similar acts occurred 
before. 
Despite courts' assertions to the contrary, evidence of acts of 
prior abuse admitted under either rationale permits or requires the 
jury to engage in impermissible propensity reasoning. If the "relation-
ship" between the defendant and the complainant has been abusive in 
the past, and the jury is instructed that it may consider that abusive 
"nature" in ascertaining whether the defendant abused the com-
plainant on the date of the charged incident, it will necessarily apply 
propensity reasoning to assess whether he committed the charged 
crime. That is precisely what the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
recently concluded when it held that evidence of prior acts of abuse 
admitted to demonstrate the "context" of a domestic violence rela-
tionship is "merely a synonym for propensity."152 
147 Jennifer Y. Schuster, Uncharged Misconduct Under Rule 404(b): The Admissibility of 
Inextricably Intertwined Evidence, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 947, 972 (1988). 
148 Imwinkelried, supra note 88, at 738-39. In People v. Till, for example, after 
observing the defendant commit an armed robbery, a police officer arrested him and 
recovered a gun. The defendant was not charged with robbery, but at the ensuing weapon 
possession trial the court permitted the officer to testify about the uncharged robbery 
because it provided "background information" and demonstrated the "continuity of the 
events." 661 N.E.2d 153, 154 (N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted). 
149 See, e.g., State v. Sanders, 716 A.2d 11, 13 (Vt. 1998) (admitting acts that occurred in 
the month before the charged assault). 
150 See, e.g., State v. Sinthavong, No. A12-0853, 2013 WL 1500714, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2013) (permitting complainant to provide a detailed account of five abusive incidents that 
occurred in the three years before the charged crimes and testify about "the general 
context of her relationship with [defendant], explaining that he called her names, 
controlled when she could see her family, and did not allow her to work" to demonstrate 
"the nature and the extent of the relationship" and to assist the jury in determining 
"whether [the defendant] committed the acts with which he was charged"). 
151 In State v. Taylor, for example, the defendant was charged with domestic assault by 
strangulation based on allegations that he choked his girlfriend. The Minnesota Court of 
Appeals found that the trial court properly admitted, under the state's "relationship 
evidence" exception, proof that he had "impeded [the complainant's] breathing on five or 
six occasions prior to the charged offense" and evidence that he grabbed a former 
girlfriend by the throat ten years earlier. No. A 11-1953, 2012 WL 4475706, at *1 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2012). 
152 State v. Davidson, 44 A.3d 454, 461 (N.H. 2012) (citation omitted); see also State v. 
Melcher, 678 A.2d 146, 150 (N.H. 1996) (finding, in a prosecution for sexual assault, that 
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The credibility rationale similarly requires propensity reasoning. 
Prior abuse is not directly probative of the complainant's credibility 
under traditional impeachment theories.153 That the complainant may 
have been abused in the past has no bearing on her general character 
for truthfulness, does not impair her ability to perceive or recall the 
charged incident, and does not constitute a prior inconsistent state-
ment. And when the complainant testifies that the charged act did not 
occur, but does not claim the relationship has never been violent,154 
prior abusive acts do not contradict the substance of her testimony. 
Finally, these prior acts do not logically demonstrate bias in favor of 
the defendant; that the complainant had been abused in the past sug-
gests that she would be biased against the defendant, yet in these cases 
the prior acts are introduced to show that her exculpatory testimony is 
untruthful. 
Instead, the jury may link the prior acts to the complainant's 
credibility by inferring that, because defendant abused her in the past, 
it is likely he committed the charged offense, rendering her present 
denial of abuse untruthful. That line of reasoning persuaded the 
Washington Court of Appeals to conclude that evidence of prior abu-
sive acts introduced to undermine a recanting complainant's credi-
bility was impermissible propensity evidence in State v. Cook. 155 
Nevertheless, the Washington Supreme Court overruled Cook in State 
v. Magers. 156 Acknowledging a trend toward admitting evidence of a 
defendant's prior acts of domestic violence under nontraditional theo-
ries that are "tied to the characteristics of domestic violence itself," 
the court concluded that "at least insofar as evidence of prior 
domestic violence is concerned," prior abusive acts are admissible to 
shed light on the credibility of a recanting witness.157 
Finally, in some states, the context exception also incorporates 
the same presumption about the psychological impairment of 
domestic violence offenders that is reflected in domestic violence pro-
pensity statutes. Minnesota and Missouri, for example, allow admis-
prior bad acts evidence admitted to demonstrate the '"relationship between the parties' 
[was] nothing more than the history of the defendant's prior sexual contact with the 
victim" and amounted to inadmissible propensity evidence (citations omitted)). 
153 Generally, a witness's credibility may be impeached in one of five ways: providing 
proof of (1) bias, (2) a "sensory or mental incapacity," (3) "bad character for truth and 
veracity," (4) a prior inconsistent statement, or (5) contradicting the substance of her 
testimony. 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD c. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
§ 6:75 (4th ed. 2013). 
154 E.g. State v. Clark, 926 P.2d 194, 197-98 (Haw. 1996); Commonwealth v. Butler, 839 
N.E.2d 307, 309 (Mass. 2005). 
155 129 P.3d 834, 838 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). 
156 189 P.3d 126, 133 (Wash. 2008). 
157 Id. (citations omitted). 
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sion of the defendants' prior acts of abuse against former intimate 
partners to demonstrate the "nature of the relationship."158 As the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals reasoned in upholding admission of evi-
dence of abusive acts against the defendant's former girlfriend under 
the relationship rationale, "evidence showing how a defendant treats 
his family or household members, such as his former spouses or other 
girlfriends, sheds light on how the defendant interacts with those close 
to him, which in turn suggests how the defendant may interact with 
the victim. "159 
B. The Medical Treatment and Diagnosis Hearsay Exception 
Statements made to medical providers for the purpose of medical 
treatment have been exempted from hearsay proscriptions for well 
over a century.160 This reliability-focused hearsay exception161 devel-
oped under common law to reflect the belief that individuals are moti-
vated by strong self-interest to speak truthfully to their medical 
provider in order to receive accurate medical treatment (the "self-
interest rationale").162 When it was codified as Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803( 4), the exception was expanded to reflect a second relia-
bility theory: that "life and death decisions are made by physicians in 
reliance on such facts and as such should have sufficient trustworthi-
158 The Minnesota statute extends to admission of acts "against other family or 
household members," MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.20 {West 2015), and includes former 
intimate partners. State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 {Minn. Ct. App. 2010). The 
Missouri statute admits any "similar" convictions for domestic violence within five years, 
regardless of the identity of the complainant. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.063 (West 2015). 
159 Valentine, 787 N.W.2d at 637 (emphasis added). 
160 See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of 
Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REv. 257, 259 {1989) (noting that the exception 
"has a long history under the common law"). The rule has existed in New York State since 
at least 1866. See Matteson v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 487, 493 (1866) {holding that 
statements of pain and suffering made to examining physicians are not hearsay). 
161 The exception is codified federally under FED. R. Evrn. 803, which "proceeds upon 
the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the 
declarant in person at the trial even though he may be available." FED. R. Evrn. 803 
advisory committee's note. 
162 See Mosteller, supra note 160, at 257 {"The theory of the exception in its archetypal 
form is straightforward: a patient's selfish interest in receiving appropriate treatment 
guarantees the trustworthiness of the statement."); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 
356 (1992) ("[A] statement made in the course of procuring medical services, where the 
declarant knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries 
special guarantees of credibility that a trier of fact may not think replicated by courtroom 
testimony."). 
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ness to be admissible in a court of law"163 (the "expert-reliance ratio-
nale"). Thus, as codified federally, and adopted verbatim or nearly 
verbatim in most states,164 a statement that is "made for-and is rea-
sonably pertinent to-medical diagnosis or treatment" and "describes 
medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their incep-
tion; or their general cause"165 is exempted from the general hearsay 
proscription. 
Even as expanded in Federal Rule of Evidence 803( 4), however, 
this exception "ordinarily" does not authorize admission of statements 
"as to fault,"166 including statements identifying the perpetrator of an 
act that prompted the patient to seek medical treatment.167 The 
reason for this exclusion is simple, and consistent with both the self-
interest and expert-reliance rationales: A doctor treating someone 
who is seeking treatment for injuries sustained during a physical 
assault, for example, will administer the same medical treatment for 
the injuries regardless of whether the assailant was a stranger or the 
patient's neighbor, boss, or friend. Knowing this, the patient has no 
motivation to truthfully identify the assailant, and the doctor does not 
rely on this information for any medical purpose, so identity is beyond 
the scope of the exception.16s 
Despite this well-established limitation, appellate courts in at 
least eight states169 and one federal circuit170 have expanded the med-
163 United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. 
Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985) (identifying the "twin policy justifications" 
underlying FED. R. Evm. 803(4)). 
164 See Mosteller, supra note 160, at 257 n.2 (listing twenty-five states that have adopted 
FED. R. Evm. 803(4) verbatim or with stylistic variation and seven states that have 
adopted modified versions). For further discussion of the history of this exception, see id. 
at 261-64. 
165 FED. R. Evm. 803(4). 
166 FED. R. Evm. 803 advisory committee's note. To illustrate this point, the drafters 
explained that "a patient's statement that he was struck by an automobile would qualify 
(for admission] but not his statement that the car was driven through a red light." Id. 
167 See, e.g., Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84 (finding that statements of identity would 
"seldom, if ever" fall within FED. R. Evm. 803(4)). 
168 See Renville, 779 F.2d at 436 (discussing why statements of identity generally fall 
outside the scope of the medical treatment and diagnosis exception). 
169 E.g., Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So. 3d 145, 150 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008); Nash v. State, 
754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); People v. Backlund, No. 240641, 2003 WL 
21246619, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. May 29, 2003); State v. Woodward, 908 P.2d 231, 238 
(N.M. 1995); People v. Ortega, 942 N.E.2d 210, 215-16 (N.Y. 2010); Williams v. Alexander, 
129 N.E.2d 417, 420 (N.Y. 1955); State v. Moen, 786 P.2d 111, 120 (Or. 1990) (en bane); 
State v. Sims, 890 P.2d 521, 523-24 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957, 
962 (Wyo. 2000); see also Commonwealth v. O'Connor, No. CRIM.A. 98-0269, 2000 WL 
34601353, at *132 (N. Mar. I. June 28, 2000). While the issue presented in Ortega was 
whether a statement in a hospital record fell within the business records hearsay exception, 
in the context of hospital records the scope of that exception is coterminous with the 
medical treatment and diagnosis exception. In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court has 
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ical treatment and diagnosis hearsay exception in domestic violence 
prosecutions to encompass a patient's identification of the assailant to 
medical providers. In these jurisdictions, when an individual seeks 
medical treatment following a domestic assault and discloses to the 
medical provider that her boyfriend caused her injuries, the provider 
may recount at an ensuing trial both that the patient reported that she 
had been assaulted and that she identified her boyfriend as the 
assailant. 
Although the medical treatment and diagnosis exception reflects 
reliability principles, in expanding this exception courts do not con-
sider, let alone decide, whether a patient's identification of her 
partner as her assailant is more reliable than other identifications. rn 
Eschewing the self-interest rationale, courts instead tangentially 
invoke the expert-reliance rationale by emphasizing the presumptively 
unique medical treatment rendered to those who report domestic vio-
lence.172 Starting from the presumption that domestic violence causes 
emotional and psychological trauma, they reason that this nonphysical 
injury distinguishes domestic violence from other types of violence.173 
They then extrapolate that "a doctor faced with a victim who has been 
assaulted by an intimate partner is not only concerned with bandaging 
wounds,"174 but rather will take actions to treat the nonphysical inju-
ries by providing "information about domestic violence and necessary 
social services,"175 advising the patient to leave her abusive partner176 
declined to "foreclose the possibility" that it might adopt a "limited categorical rule of 
admissibility under the medical exception to hearsay for statements of identification by 
victims of domestic violence." State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400, 407 (Minn. 2006). 
110 United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1494 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he identity of the abuser 
is reasonably pertinent to treatment in virtually every domestic sexual assault case .... "). 
171 Interestingly, doing so would raise consistency problems for courts that have 
concluded, in other contexts, that domestic violence complainants are more likely to lie 
about the cause of their injuries or the identity of their assailant. See supra Part II.A. 
172 See, e.g., Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 215 ("[Domestic violence] differs materially, both as 
an offense and a diagnosis, from other types of assault in its effect on the victim and in the 
resulting treatment."). 
173 See, e.g., Joe, 8 F.3d at 1494 ("All victims of domestic sexual abuse suffer emotional 
and psychological injuries, the exact nature and extent of which depend on the identity of 
the abuser."); accord Moore, 1 So. 3d at 150 (quoting Joe, 8 F.3d at 1494-95); Nash, 754 
N.E.2d at 1025 (same); see also Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 215-16 ("In addition to physical 
injuries, a victim of domestic violence may have a whole host of other issues to confront, 
including psychological and trauma issues .... "); People v. Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d 336, 340 
(Crim. Ct. 1998) ("Unlike other types of assault, domestic violence results not only in 
physical injuries to its frightened and battered victims but also will have a traumatic impact 
on the victims' psychological well-being."). 
174 Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 215-16; see also Joe, 8 F.3d at 1495 ("[T]he physician's 
treatment will necessarily differ when the abuser is a member of the victim's family or 
household."). 
175 Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 215-16. 
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or seek counseling,177 and/or contacting the police.178 Therefore, 
because the revelation of domestic violence causes a medical provider 
to treat the nonphysical injuries, the identification of the assailant is 
medically relevant and falls within the medical treatment and diag-
nosis hearsay exception.179 
Yet there is a significant disconnect between the courts' reasoning 
and the evidentiary ruling. The causation of emotional and psycholog-
ical trauma hardly distinguishes domestic violence from other forms of 
assault; all or most acts of violence cause nonphysical injuries.180 The 
true "difference" between domestic violence and other types of 
assault that seems to motivate the expansion of this hearsay exception 
is not the causation of nonphysical trauma, per se, but rather an 
assumption about the impact of such trauma on the patient's ability or 
willingness to prevent future harm. Invoking the specter of learned 
helplessness, courts imply that patients who report domestic violence 
require doctors to intervene and take preventative measures on their 
behalf. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Roberts is illus-
trative. The complainant sought medical treatment at an emergency 
room after being assaulted.181 Though she wanted only to be 
"examined, treated, and allowed to leave the hospital" and was 
unwilling to discuss what happened to her, the doctor believed her 
injuries were the result of domestic violence.182 The doctor testified 
that "such patients are often, because of psychological dependencies, 
unable to leave the abusive relationship and unwilling to report the 
176 See Joe, 8 F.3d at 1496 ("In the domestic sexual abuse case ... the treating physician 
may ... instruct the victim to remove herself from the dangerous environment by leaving 
the home and seeking shelter elsewhere."); State v. Roberts, 775 P.2d 342, 343 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1989) (accepting doctor's testimony that identity was relevant in treating patients 
who disclose domestic violence). 
177 Joe, 8 F.3d at 1496 ("[T]he treating physician may recommend special therapy or 
counseling."). 
178 Commonwealth v. O'Connor, No. CRIM.A. 98-0269, 2000 WL 34601353, at *128 (N. 
Mar. I. June 28, 2000); Roberts, 775 P.2d at 343. 
179 Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ("[W]here injury occurs as 
the result of domestic violence, which may alter the course of diagnosis and treatment, trial 
courts may properly exercise their discretion in admitting statements regarding identity of 
the perpetrator."). 
180 A brochure published by the Department of Justice's Office for Victims of Crime, 
for example, counsels that all assault victims may experience emotional consequences and 
that the assault may cause a "significant immediate and long-term emotional impact." 
OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ovc HELP SERIES FOR CRIME 
VICTIMS: AssAULT, available at http://www.ovc.gov/pubs/helpseries/pdfs/HelpBrochure_As 
sault.pdf. 
181 Roberts, 775 P.2d at 343. 
182 id. 
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abuse," so he "attempts to discover the history of the patient's rela-
tionship with the assailant so that, in a proper case, he may advise the 
patient to leave the relationship and to seek psychological coun-
seling."183 After the complainant eventually disclosed that her boy-
friend had caused her injuries, the doctor called the police, advised 
her to "remove herself from the abusive environment," and referred 
her to a crisis center for counseling.184 At the defendant's trial for 
second-degree assault, the complainant recanted her allegations of 
abuse, but her identification to her doctor of the defendant as her 
assailant was admitted as substantive evidence of guilt under the med-
ical treatment and diagnosis hearsay exception.185 
The origins of this hearsay expansion substantiate the inference 
that courts are concerned primarily with the patient's perceived 
inability to prevent future harm. The first jurisdictions to expand the 
medical treatment and diagnosis exception to include identification 
statements in domestic violence prosecutions drew directly upon deci-
sions that authorized a similar expansion in child abuse prosecu-
tions.186 Explicitly analogizing domestic violence to child abuse, courts 
concluded that the same expansion was warranted in domestic vio-
lence prosecutions.187 Yet, these courts glossed over a key distinction 
between the two scenarios: A primary justification for expanding the 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 See Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 477 n.2 (Wyo. 1997) ("[A]n overwhelming majority 
of jurisdictions, including at least 32 states and 4 federal circuits, allow into evidence 
statements regarding the identity of the perpetrator in child physical or sexual assault 
cases."); 2 McCORMICK ON EvrnENCE § 278, at 251 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) 
("In [child abuse cases], a number of courts have admitted a broad range of statements by 
children, including statements identifying a particular individual as the perpetrator of the 
offense."). 
187 See, e.g., United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1494 (10th Cir. 1993) (analyzing the 
expansion of the medical treatment and diagnosis exception in child abuse proceedings and 
concluding that, although the complainant was not a child, "the identity of the abuser is 
reasonably pertinent to treatment in virtually every domestic sexual assault case, even 
those not involving children"); Commonwealth v. O'Connor, No. CRIM.A. 98-0269, 2000 
WL 34601353, at *130 (N. Mar. I. June 28, 2000) (discussing Joe and discerning "no reason 
to stray from the sound reasoning of other courts which have refused to apply this 
exception solely to children"); State v. Sims, 890 P.2d 521, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) 
(holding that, for reasons "similar" to those relied on in child abuse prosecutions, "a 
statement attributing fault to an abuser can be reasonably pertinent to treatment in 
domestic sexual assault cases involving adults"). See also Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So. 3d 
145, 149-50 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (describing how often child abuse cases admit 
identifications of perpetrators by abuse victims); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1024-25 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that rationales used in child abuse cases are often similarly 
applicable in domestic violence cases); State v. Moen, 786 P.2d 111, 121 (Or. 1990) (en 
bane) ("Admissibility of statements of the type challenged here is not limited to cases 
involving child abuse."). 
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scope of "medical treatment" for children is the existence of a legal 
mandate that doctors intervene on behalf of minors, who are unable 
to make decisions about their aftercare, to prevent them from being 
returned to an abusive guardian.188 Adult domestic violence patients, 
by contrast, are legally and developmentally capable of making their 
own medical and relationship decisions.189 The two scenarios simply 
are not parallel: Even if the expansion is justified in child abuse prose-
cutions, it does not follow that the expansion is warranted in domestic 
violence prosecutions. 
In any event, the actions taken by the doctor upon the disclosure 
of domestic violence are not the type of "medical treatment" this 
hearsay exception is intended to encompass. In the cases cited above, 
the revelation of domestic violence did not cause the doctor to directly 
treat the emotional trauma, but rather to refer the patient to social 
services, dispense relationship advice, or contact the police.190 These 
actions do not require the kind of specialized medical risk analysis 
that renders statements for the purpose of medical treatment and 
diagnosis reliable; erroneously informing the patient about available 
social services, for example, does not have the same kind of dele-
terious impact as prescribing the wrong medication or performing an 
unnecessary operation. As a normative matter, we may want to 
encourage doctors and other medical providers to take these 
extramedical steps and act as intermediaries between patients and 
social services. Yet, simply because a medical provider-as opposed to 
a social worker or a police officer-fills this role does not render it a 
"medical" act that carries an imprimatur of reliability. 
Thus, in expanding the medical treatment and diagnosis excep-
tion to include the identity of the perpetrator in domestic violence 
prosecutions, courts conclude neither that domestic violence com-
188 See United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 438 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[P]hysicians have 
an obligation, imposed by state law, to prevent an abused child from being returned to an 
environment in which he or she cannot be adequately protected from recurrent abuse."); 
see also 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 186, § 278, at 251 n.9 (emphasis added) 
("[K]nowledge of the perpetrator is important to the treatment of psychological injuries 
that may relate to the identity of the perpetrator and to the removal of the child from the 
abuser's custody or control."). 
189 There is a growing-and controversial-trend toward the adoption of mandatory 
reporting requirements for medical providers who have reason to believe their patients 
have experienced domestic violence. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, If All You Have ls a 
Hammer: Society's Ineffective Response to Intimate Partner Violence, 60 CATH. U. L. REv. 
919, 950 (2011) (describing the "trend toward enacting mandatory reporting of [intimate 
partner violence]" that began in California and has sparked controversy). Although, as of 
2011, 21 states and the District of Columbia had adopted some form of mandatory 
reporting requirement, id. at 951, only four states had required direct reporting to law 
enforcement. Id. at 952. 
190 See supra notes 175-79, 181-85 and accompanying text. 
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plainants are more likely to speak truthfully to their medical providers 
nor that medical providers stake "life and death" medical decisions191 
upon the revelation that the assailant is an intimate partner.192 
Avoiding both of the reliability-focused rationales that motivated the 
exception's adoption, they instead invoke prevailing presumptions 
about the impact of domestic violence on the complainant's ability or 
willingness to end the relationship to justify the departure from this 
well-established limit to this hearsay exception.193 
The expansion of this hearsay exception is hardly inconsequen-
tial, particularly for prosecutions in which the complainant declines to 
testify.194 Dicta in Giles v. California imply that statements to medical 
providers are firmly beyond the scope of the Confrontation Clause.195 
Therefore, prosecutors can comfortably use this exception to fill evi-
dentiary gaps created by the complainant's absence by introducing her 
prior accusation against the defendant through the sterilized testi-
mony of a medical professional. 
C. Forfeiture by Wrongdoing 
Under the longstanding doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing,196 a 
defendant forfeits his right to prevent, on hearsay and Confrontation 
Clause grounds, the admission of statements from unavailable declar-
191 United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980). 
192 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. 
193 See, e.g., Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So. 3d 145, 149-50 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (ruling 
the identity of a domestic abuser relevant to medical treatment so that the medical 
provider can advise the patient to leave the abuser and seek shelter elsewhere); State v. 
Roberts, 775 P.2d 342, 343 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (deeming identity of domestic abuser 
relevant to medical treatment because domestic violence renders patients "unable to leave 
the abusive relationship and unwilling to report the abuse"). 
194 When the complainant testifies at trial that the defendant assaulted her, the 
introduction of her prior identification to her medical provider will corroborate her in-
court testimony, but may add little to the overall weight of the evidence. 
195 See 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008) ("[O]nly testimonial statements are excluded by the 
Confrontation Clause .... [S]tatements to physicians in the course of receiving treatment 
would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules .... "). 
196 The doctrine was used as early as 1666 in Lord Morley's Case. James F. Flanagan, 
Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in Witness Intimidation: A Reach 
Exceeding Its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 51 
DRAKE L. REv. 459, 462 (2003) ("As early as 1666, English law recognized that an absent 
witness's deposition could be admitted in lieu of live testimony if the witness was 
unavailable because a party procured the absence .... ").The Supreme Court first applied 
the forfeiture doctrine in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), holding that the 
statements' admission "did not violate the right of the defendant to confront witnesses at 
trial, because when a witness is absent by the defendant's 'wrongful procurement' the 
defendant 'is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated' if 
'their evidence is supplied in some lawful way."' Giles, 554 U.S. at 366 (quoting Reynolds, 
98 U.S. at 158)). 
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ants whose absence that defendant "obtain[ed] ... by wrongdoing."197 
Unlike most hearsay exceptions, the forfeiture doctrine is not a "sur-
rogate" for the statement's reliability.198 Rather, it is an equitable 
principle that prevents one who procures a witness's absence by 
wrongful means from benefiting from that wrong.199 In other words, a 
defendant who wrongfully renders a witness unavailable to testify-
through coercion, intimidation, chicanery, homicide, or other nefa-
rious means-cannot reap the benefit of that wrongful action at trial 
by preventing admission of that witness's hearsay statements.200 
Given the frequency with which domestic violence complainants 
decline to testify at trial,201 many have identified the forfeiture doc-
trine as crucial to prosecution's ability to proceed in the complainant's 
absence, particularly after Crawford v. Washington.202 Equity, how-
ever, is "a two-way street";203 while the forfeiture doctrine protects 
the integrity of the court from wrongful defendant-induced eviden-
197 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006). 
198 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
199 Id. 
200 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158 (ruling that one who "wrongful[ly] procure[s]" the 
absence of a witness "cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the 
place of that which he has kept away" and "cannot insist on" the constitutional privilege of 
being "confronted with the witnesses against him"). Because one loses his or her right to 
invoke the protection of the Confrontation Clause or hearsay rules only through actions 
intended to interfere with the truth-seeking process of the criminal justice system, see 
Flanagan, supra note 196, at 482-84 (describing the intent requirement used by courts in 
invoking the misconduct exception), some courts and commentators have aptly 
characterized the doctrine as based on waiver principles instead of forfeiture. See, e.g., 
United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982) (referring to "waiver by 
misconduct"); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), superseded 
by rule on other grounds, FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(6), as recognized in United States v. 
Nelson, 242 F. App'x 164, 170-71 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[A] defendant who causes a witness to 
be unavailable for trial for the purpose of preventing that witness from testifying also 
waives his right to confrontation .... "); Flanagan, supra note 196, at 483 ("Nothing in 
these opinions suggests that either the federal or state courts were establishing the broader 
principle that responsibility for the witness's absence, regardless of intent, would be a 
waiver of constitutional and evidentiary rights."). 
201 See, e.g., De Sanctis, supra note 17, at 367-68 ("[V]ictims of domestic violence are 
uncooperative [with the prosecution] in approximately eighty to ninety percent of cases."); 
Lininger, supra note 16, at 768 ("Recent evidence suggests that 80 to 85 percent of battered 
women will recant at some point."). 
202 See, e.g., Andrew King-Ries, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: A Panacea for Victimless 
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 39 CREIGHTON L. REv. 441, 449 (2006) (arguing that 
forfeiture by wrongdoing "may present an opportunity for domestic violence prosecutors 
to combat domestic violence under the worst of circumstances: namely, when the victim is 
unable to participate in the prosecution"); Lininger, supra note 16, at 807-08 
(recommending universal codification of a forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception to 
"diminish the detrimental effect of Crawford on prosecutions of domestic violence"). 
203 James F. Flanagan, We Have a "Purpose" Requirement if We Can Keep It, 13 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 553, 575 (2009). 
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tiary gaps,204 it also prevents criminal defendants from being stripped 
of essential evidentiary and constitutional protections upon a mere 
allegation they committed any wrongful act in the past. Forfeiture of 
essential constitutional and evidentiary protections is an equitable 
response only if the defendant intentionally prevents the declarant 
from cooperating with a court proceeding.205 Therefore, the doctrine, 
as developed in common law, codified in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence206 and state evidence codes,207 and recently clarified in Giles 
v. California, requires three criteria: that the defendant (1) engaged in 
wrongful conduct (2) for the purpose of preventing a witness from 
testifying that (3) caused the witness's unavailability. 
Scholars have thoroughly examined the connection between the 
first two elements in domestic violence prosecutions, especially in 
light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Crawford v. Washington and 
204 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) (suggesting the forfeiture doctrine 
is appropriate when defendants "undermine the judicial process by procuring or coercing 
silence from witnesses and victims" or otherwise act "in ways that destroy the integrity of 
the criminal-trial system"). The doctrine was codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence to 
provide "a prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent behavior 'which strikes at the heart of 
the system of justice itself."' FED. R. Evm. 804 advisory committee's note (quoting 
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273). 
205 Joan Comparet-Cassani, Crawford and the Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Exception, 42 
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1185, 1207 (2005) (discussing the "law of equity" and concluding that, 
"without the presence of that intent [to prevent the witness from testifying] there is no 
legal justification for the equitable reprimand" embodied in the forfeiture doctrine). 
206 FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(6) authorizes admission of a "statement offered against a party 
that wrongfully caused-or acquiesced in wrongfully causing-the declarant's 
unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result." FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(6) 
(emphasis added). This rule "codifies the forfeiture doctrine." Davis, 547 U.S. at 833. As 
developed under common law, the same forfeiture standards apply to both constitutional 
and evidentiary forfeiture. See United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
("More commonly ... courts have taken the view ... that misconduct leading to the loss of 
confrontation rights also necessarily causes the defendant to forfeit hearsay objections." 
(citation omitted)). The majority opinion in Giles, however, stressed that states may adopt 
a less demanding standard for evidentiary forfeiture. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 
(2008). 
207 At least 18 states have codified this hearsay exception. See CAL. Evm. CoDE § 1350 
(West 1995 & Supp. 2015); GA. CODE ANN.§ 24-8-804(b)(5) (2013); MD. CODE ANN., Crs. 
& Jun. PRoc. § 10-901(LexisNexis2013 & Supp. 2014); DEL R. Evm. 804(b)(6); HAw. R. 
Evm. 804(b)(7); IND. R. Evm. 804(b)(5); Iowa R. Evm. 5.804(b)(6); KY. R. Evm. 
804(b)(5); MASS. R. Evm. 804(b)(6); MICH. R. Evm. 804(b)(6); N.J. R. Evm. 804(b)(9); 
N.M. R. Evm. 11-804(B)(5); N.D. R. Evm. 804(b)(6); OHIO R. Evm. 804(B)(6); OR. R. 
Evm. 804(3)(f); PA. R. Evm. 804(b)(6); TENN. R. Evm. 804(b)(6); VT. R. Evm. 804(b)(6). 
New York, which lacks codified rules of evidence, also recognizes this exception. People v. 
Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 820-21 (N.Y. 1995). For an overview of the slight variances 
between the state statutes, see Giles, 554 U.S. at 367-68 n.2. Despite the variations, states 
"use the general principles found in the federal cases .... " Flanagan, supra note 196, at 
470. 
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Giles v. California.208 Instead of repeating those analyses, this section 
will briefly recount the developments of Giles before focusing on an 
area that has received less attention: the nexus between the defen-
dant's wrongful conduct and the causation element. 
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the 
Sixth Amendment guaranteed criminal defendants the opportunity to 
cross-examine declarants of testimonial statements.209 By reinvigo-
rating a defendant's right to an in-court confrontation with his 
accuser, Crawford cast doubt on the continued viability of tactics that 
had been developed to enable prosecution of domestic violence 
crimes without the complainant's participation.210 
In response, scholars and prosecutors demanded a more permis-
sive forfeiture standard that reflected the need for hearsay evidence in 
domestic violence prosecutions.211 Reasoning that Crawford per-
mitted-and even compelled-the expansion of the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing exception beyond deliberate witness tampering,212 courts 
began finding forfeiture in domestic homicide prosecutions without 
208 E.g., Flanagan, supra note 203, at 553 ("[T]he purpose requirement of Giles, and 
ultimately Crawford's protection of the Confrontation Clause, will be undermined unless 
the courts require strict 'but for' proof of the reason for the witness's absence, including 
proof that the witness did not have independent personal reasons for avoiding testifying."); 
Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their 
Victims, 87 TEx. L. REv. 857, 874-75 (2009) ("The most controversial topic in Giles was 
the notion that domestic violence, by its very nature, might amount to wrongful conduct 
sufficient to forfeit confrontation rights .... [A] majority of the Court apparently endorsed 
the notion of 'inferred intent' whereby a long-term abusive relationship might support a 
finding of forfeiture."); Myrna S. Raeder, Thoughts About Giles and Forfeiture in 
Domestic Violence Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REv. 1329, 1345--47 (2010) (discussing the roles of 
"inferred intent" stemming from misconduct in domestic violence cases). 
209 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004). 
210 Under these "evidence-based" or "victimless" prosecution tactics, police were 
required to respond "differently and more thoroughly" to domestic violence cases than 
they would other acts of violence by collecting physical evidence and statements from 
complainants immediately following the reported abuse. GoooMARK, supra note 5, at 
110-11. Prosecutors would rely on this evidence, in combination with medical records and 
911 calls, to pursue charges even if the complainant declined to testify at trial. Id. 
211 See, e.g., King-Ries, supra note 202, at 460--61 (identifying the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine as a "solution to Crawford" that permits the continued viability of 
"victimless prosecutions"); Adam M. Krischer, "Though Justice May Be Blind, It ls Not 
Stupid": Applying Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic Violence Cases, PROSECUTOR, 
Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 14, 15-16 (identifying "forfeiture by domestic violence" as a "long-term 
solution" to the obstacles to evidence-based prosecution after Crawford). 
212 See, e.g., People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 443--44 (Cal. 2007), vacated, 554 U.S. 353 
(2008) (acknowledging that the forfeiture doctrine generally applied to deliberate witness 
tampering, but concluding that after Crawford, courts should admit "relevant evidence that 
the defendant caused not to be available through live testimony," even if the defendant did 
not intend to cause the declarant's unavailability as a witness); State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 
518, 535 (Wis. 2007) ("[W]e believe that in a post-Crawford world [a] broad view of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing ... is essential."). 
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any proof that the defendant killed the decedent to prevent her from 
testifying or cooperating with the authorities.213 A six-justice majority 
of the Supreme Court put a halt to this practice in Giles v. California, 
ruling that a defendant forfeits his confrontation right only if he com-
mits a wrongful act for the purpose of procuring her absence as a 
witness.214 
Ultimately the Giles decision, which was comprised of five opin-
ions,21s "left open more questions than it answered,"216 one of which 
is worth highlighting here. Though the majority purportedly rejected 
calls for a "special" forfeiture standard that exempted domestic vio-
lence from the intent requirement,217 the question remains whether, in 
fact, the intent requirement carries a different meaning in domestic 
violence prosecutions. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
wrote in his concurring opinion that the requisite intent to forfeit 
could be "inferred" from a "classic abusive relationship, which is 
meant to isolate the victim from outside help, including the aid of law 
enforcement and the judicial process."218 Justice Breyer, joined by 
Justices Stevens and Kennedy in his dissent, agreed with this passage, 
which he interpreted as a conclusion that proof of past domestic abuse 
is "sufficient" for a finding of forfeiture in a domestic homicide prose-
cution.219 Thus, it seems this five-justice "majority"220 in fact supports 
the adoption of a "special, improvised"221 intent standard for domestic 
violence prosecutions under which a defendant who abuses a com-
plainant prospectively forfeits his future confrontation and hearsay 
objections to the admission of her statements in a future legal 
proceeding. 222 
213 E.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005); United States 
v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 963, 966-69 (S.D. Ohio 2005); Giles, 152 P.3d at 443-44; 
Jensen, 727 N.W.2d at 521, 534-36 (embracing the Garcia-Meza court's view on intent in 
applying the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine). 
214 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 354, 359-62 (2008). The Court clarified that the 
only "wrong" from which the doctrine prevented a defendant from benefitting was 
"conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying." Id. at 359. 
215 Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Alito joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion in full, 
and Justices Souter and Ginsberg joined in part. Id. at 354. Justices Thomas and Alito filed 
concurring opinions. Id. Justice Souter filed an opinion concurring in part. Id. Justice 
Breyer filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens and Kennedy joined. Id. 
216 Raeder, supra note 208, at 1332. 
217 Giles, 554 U.S. at 376-77. 
218 Id. at 379-80 (Souter, J., concurring). 
219 Id. at 380, 404-05 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
220 This refers to Justices Souter and Ginsburg in concurrence and Justices Breyer, 
Stevens, and Kennedy in dissent. 
221 Giles, 554 U.S. at 376. 
222 For further discussion of this "inferred intent" standard, see Raeder, supra note 208, 
at 1343-47; Lininger, supra note 208, at 874-75. 
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Under this "majority" standard, forfeiture may be an equitable 
response to abusive acts that occurred well before any criminal pro-
ceeding was underway. Furthermore, states remain "free to adopt" 
less stringent forfeiture standards for the admission of hearsay.223 In 
this era of the "[i]ncredible [ s]hrinking Confrontation Clause,"224 evi-
dence rules may have an increasingly greater impact on the adjudica-
tion of guilt than Sixth Amendment confrontation restrictions. 
An area that has garnered less attention is one that the Court did 
not have to address in Giles: the requisite nexus between the defen-
dant's wrongful conduct and the declarant's unavailability as a wit-
ness.225 When a witness does not appear in court, and the prosecution 
can establish that the defendant has engaged in threatening or other 
coercive behaviors, establishing causation is rather straightforward. A 
more challenging inquiry arises with some frequency226 in nonhomi-
cide domestic violence prosecutions: A complainant will be present in 
court, but refuse to testify for the prosecution, invoke a privilege, 
and/or claim to not remember the substance of her requested testi-
mony, and deny that the defendant threatened her or otherwise 
caused her "unavailability" as a witness.227 
Of course, a witness's insistence that she has not been intimidated 
into unavailability is not the last word on causation; "in a case 
involving coercion or threats, a witness who refuses to testify at trial 
will not testify to the actions procuring his or her unavailability."228 
Thus, courts routinely examine the circumstances surrounding the 
unavailability to determine causation.229 
223 Giles, 554 U.S. at 376. 
224 Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. REv. 1865, 
1865, 1867-68 (2012) (summarizing Supreme Court jurisprudence restricting the scope of 
the Confrontation Clause after Crawford v. Washington). 
225 In Giles it was uncontested that the defendant caused the witness's death and, 
consequently, her unavailability as a witness. See 554 U.S. at 356 (describing the events of 
the witness's death and defendant's testimony confirming responsibility, but claiming self-
defense ). 
226 See supra note 201 (describing the frequency with which domestic violence 
complaining witnesses decline to testify at trial). 
227 A witness may be "unavailable" for forfeiture purposes even if she is present but 
refuses to testify, invokes a privilege, or testifies she cannot remember the subject matter 
of her requested testimony. See FED. R. Evm. 804(a) (defining "unavailability"). 
228 United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2002); see also People v. Geraci, 
649 N.E.2d 817, 823 (N.Y. 1995) ("[G]iven the inherently surreptitious nature of witness 
tampering," the party seeking a forfeiture finding "will often have nothing more to rely 
upon than circumstantial proof."). 
229 In United States v. Scott, for example, an uncooperative witness did not testify at the 
forfeiture hearing, so the court examined the circumstances in which the witness became 
"unavailable" to determine whether the defendant had forfeited his right to object to the 
admission of the witness's grand jury testimony. Based on testimony from a third party that 
the defendant had told the witness to "keep his mouth shut" and that the witness seemed 
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There is a growing consensus that there are many reasons that a 
domestic violence complainant will become "unavailable" as a wit-
ness, including love, financial reliance, immigration concerns, a desire 
to keep their family intact, and threats or coercion that lead to fear of 
reprisal.230 Only one of these reasons-fear induced by defendant's 
threats or coercion-should result in imposition of the "equitable" 
remedy of forfeiture. Indeed, it is hardly fair to apply the doctrine 
"when it does not appear that the witness was absent by the sugges-
tion, connivance, or procurement of the accused .... "231 Nevertheless, 
in a few jurisdictions, even when complainants offer reasons for 
refusing to testify that are not attributable to the defendant's wrongful 
conduct, courts draw on prevailing stereotypes about domestic vio-
lence to find that, in fact, the defendant caused her unavailability.232 
In essence, these courts conclude that a different "equitable" equation 
applies in domestic violence prosecutions: If the defendant has abused 
the complainant in the past it is fair to infer that he caused her to 
absent herself as a witness-even if she says otherwise. While this 
practice is currently limited to only a few jurisdictions, commentators 
"nervous and scared," the court found forfeiture. 284 F.3d at 762-64. And in People v. 
Geraci, the court found that the defendant had caused the witness's unavailability for 
forfeiture purposes, despite the witness's denial that the defendant had threatened him, 
based on the witness's previous statements to officers that he feared reprisal from the 
defendant and that the defendant had paid him to refrain from testifying. 649 N.E.2d at 
819-20, 823-24. 
230 E.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 52 ("Legal intervention may provide women 
certain protection from battering, but it does not provide women housing, support, child 
care, employment, community acceptance, or Jove. It also does not deal with the economic 
realities of life."); Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic 
Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1191, 1232 
(1993) (identifying contextual factors that may influence a battered woman as "fear of 
retaliation," available "economic (and other tangible) resources," "concern for her 
children," "emotional attachment to her partner," "personal emotional strengths, such as 
hope or optimism," "race, ethnicity, and culture," "emotional, mental, and physical 
vulnerabilities," and "perception of the availability of social support"); Miccio, supra note 
57, at 307 ("If we listen to women survivors, we learn that they stay [with their abusers] for 
myriad reasons-fear of reprisal, fear of losing their children, economic concerns, 
emotional ties to the batterer or his family, lack of social or familial support, and lack of a 
place to go."). 
231 Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900). 
232 For example, in United States v. Montague, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court 
that found that the defendant caused the unavailability of his wife, who refused to testify 
against him and invoked marital privilege, based on evidence that he abused her in the past 
and had contact with her before trial-when she went to visit him in prison. 421 F.3d 1099, 
1101, 1103-04 (10th Cir. 2005); see also People v. Byrd, 855 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509-10 (App. 
Div. 2008) (relying on expert testimony that the complainant was a battered woman to 
reject the complainant's testimony that she was not testifying for reasons not attributable 
to the defendant's conduct); People v. Santiago, No. 2725-02, 2003 WL 21507176, at *2, 
*11-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 7, 2003) (same). 
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have suggested that it may233 or should234 be used more frequently, 
especially after Giles. 
A handful of decisions emerging from New York State domestic 
violence prosecutions highlight the troubling implications of this spe-
cialized causation standard. In People v. Santiago, the defendant was 
arrested for violating an order of protection against his girlfriend.235 
The complainant reluctantly testified before the grand jury, but soon 
thereafter left messages for the prosecutor explaining that life as a 
"single parent" was "very hard" and that she could not work full time 
because no one else was available to watch her daughter (presumably 
because the defendant was in jail), and asking that the prosecutor 
drop the charges.236 When the complainant declined to testify at trial, 
the prosecution argued the defendant had forfeited his right to object 
to the admission of her inculpatory grand jury testimony.237 
At an extensive forfeiture hearing, the complainant testified that 
she loved the defendant, had falsified accusations against him in the 
past out of jealousy, and had acted violently towards him on occa-
sion.238 The prosecution called an expert witness who testified that 
this was a "classic example of a domestic violence relationship" and 
that the complainant was an "abused woman whose current behavior 
is explained by Battered Women's Syndrome."239 She opined that the 
complainant's behavior reflected an "imposed lack of self esteem" and 
"level of desperation" that "can only be attributed to the coercion 
inherent in the honeymoon phase of the cycle of violence" and the 
"tremendous pressure" the defendant placed on her.240 
The court admitted that, in "other kinds of cases" it would 
"take[ ] for granted that a complainant's desire to withdraw from the 
prosecution" was not attributable to the defendant.241 Yet, it rea-
soned, domestic violence cases "are to be viewed differently from 
other crimes of violence which come through our courts. "242 The court 
233 See Flanagan, supra note 203, at 573-76 (offering "cautionary thoughts" on 
establishing causation after Giles). 
234 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Forfeiture After Giles: The Relevance of "Domestic 
Violence Context," 13 LEw1s & CLARK L. REv. 711, 726 (2009) ("With respect to both 
mens rea and causation, then, Giles represents an invitation to prosecutors to make salient 
the full spectrum of abuse that resulted in a live victim's absence from trial."). 
235 2003 WL 21507176, at *l. 
236 Id. at *9-10. The complainant also visited the defendant ten times in jail, and the 
defendant called her more than 100 times. Id. at *11. 
237 Id. at *l. 
238 Id. at *2, *4. 
239 Id. at *12. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at *14. 
242 Id. at *15. 
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contrasted complainants in "the vast majority of cases," who will 
"follow through [with the prosecution] because they have the 
strength, the will and the need to do so," with domestic violence com-
plainants, who "lack the self esteem and strength to seek retribution 
or permanent safety from their attackers."243 It concluded a domestic 
violence complainant's "attempts to become unavailable as a prose-
cuting witness cannot be viewed as ... voluntary,"244 and that the 
defendant had caused the complainant's refusal to testify by using her 
"desires for a normal and loving relationship to his own end."245 
Therefore, it ruled that the defendant had forfeited his right to objec-
tion to the admission of her inculpatory grand jury testimony.246 
A similar fact pattern unfolded in People v. Byrd, and to the 
same effect.247 While the allegations against the defendant were more 
troubling than in Santiago,248 the complainant's assertion that he did 
not cause her unavailability was even more adamant. At the forfeiture 
hearing, she "maintained that her refusal to testify was a product of 
her free choice, that she wanted to forgive defendant and that she 
believed he needed treatment rather than incarceration."249 She 
denied that the defendant had asked her to refrain from testifying, 
and stated that she initially cooperated with the prosecution "out of 
fear that the Administration for Child Services would take her child 
from her."250 She also wrote a letter to the court indicating she did not 
want the defendant to remain in jail, expressing confidence that he 
could change if given the chance to do so, and conveying sadness that 
their daughter would spend another holiday season without him.251 
The prosecution presented the same expert witness who had testi-
fied in Santiago,252 and the expert again recounted the cycle of vio-
lence theory and concluded that the defendant and complainant's 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. at *13. This conclusion is all the more notable since New York applies the 
demanding clear and convincing evidence standard to forfeiture rulings. Flanagan, supra 
note 196, at 469. Most states apply a less demanding preponderance standard. See id. at 477 
("Following the majority of courts the [advisory committee for the Federal Rules of 
Evidence] concluded that the proponent's burden of proof was the preponderance of the 
evidence."). 
246 2003 WL 21507176, at *16. 
247 855 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507, 509-10 (App. Div. 2008). 
248 Byrd was charged with attempting to murder the complainant based on allegations 
that he brutally assaulted the complainant and then prevented her from seeking medical 
care for six days. Id. at 507. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 509. 
252 The expert in both cases was Professor Ann Burgess. Id. at 508; People v. Santiago, 
No. 2725-02, 2003 WL 21507176, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 7, 2003). 
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relationship fit this "typical pattern."253 Although the expert had 
never met the complainant,254 she concluded that the complainant was 
"in a coercive controlled relationship with the defendant," that he 
could control her "without engaging in any conduct whatsoever,"255 
and that such control caused the complainant to "lie under oath to 
protect him."256 Crediting the expert's testimony over the com-
plainant's, the court concluded that the defendant had caused the 
complainant's unavailability as a witness. The state appellate court 
upheld this decision on appeal,257 as did the Southern District of New 
York in reviewing defendant's habeas petition.258 
These decisions demonstrate a willingness, even in the absence of 
evidence of direct or implied threats connected to the complainant's 
impending testimony, and even when the complainant herself testifies 
that she is refusing to inculpate the defendant of her own free will, to 
infer from proof of past abuse that the defendant caused the witness's 
unavailability. The complainants in both cases offered alternative and 
reasonable reasons for refusing to support the prosecution: love, the 
desire to keep the family intact, and the practical daily need for the 
defendant's assistance.259 Nevertheless, these courts seem to conclude 
that when a complainant has been abused, fear of reprisal is the only 
reason she could refuse to cooperate with the prosecution. 
An even more recent New York State forfeiture decision in 
People v. Copney underscores this myopic interpretation of causa-
tion.260 There, the trial court invoked the tort doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur to conclude that a "complainant would not ordinarily stop 
253 People v. Byrd, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 508. 
254 Byrd v. Brown, No. 09 CIV. 5755(GBD)(JCF), 2010 WL 6764702, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 25, 2010), adopted by No. 09 CIV. 5755(GBD)(JCF), 2011 WL 2162140 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 1, 2011). 
255 Id. 
256 People v. Byrd, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 508. 
257 Id. at 510. 
258 Byrd v. Brown, 2011 WL 2162140. 
259 See supra note 230 and accompanying text (outlining reasons complainants might 
refuse to cooperate). And the Byrd court refused to engage the complainant's claim that 
she had been coerced not by defendant, but rather by the Administration of Children's 
Services, through threats to take her children from her. People v. Byrd, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 
510. Yet, this threat was credible and verifiable: The incident at issue in Byrd occurred in 
2002. Until the 2004 settlement in Nicholson v. Scoppetta, New York State Administration 
for Children's Services routinely removed children from the care of mothers who were 
abused by their partners. See Kathleen A. Copps, The Good, the Bad, and the Future of 
Nicholson v. Scoppetta: An Analysis of the Effects and Suggestions for Further 
Improvements, 72 ALB. L. REv. 497, 503-09 (2009) (discussing ACS practices and New 
York State law leading up to and following the settlement in Nicholson v. Scoppetta). For 
an explanation of the complex procedural history of that case, see Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 
820 N.E.2d 840, 842-43 (N.Y. 2004). 
260 969 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 2013). 
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cooperating with the district attorney but for the agency of the defen-
dant's [phone] calls [from prison] in which she did not voluntarily act 
or contribute."261 Therefore, despite conflicting evidence as to 
whether the defendant's phone calls caused the complainant's unavail-
ability, the court concluded it was "clear that the wrongful calls of the 
defendant, aimed and intended to silence the witness, made and 
caused her to be unavailable to the People. "262 In other words, the 
domestic violence "speaks for itself" and it can convey only one story, 
regardless of what the complainant says. 
III 
THE IMPACT OF EvmENTIARY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
ExcEPTIONALISM 
Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer and others have critiqued the 
use of traditional evidence rules in domestic violence prosecutions for 
"mut[ing] stories of battering" and evidentiary doctrine for 
"unmoor[ing]" domestic violence from its context.263 Yet, as the pre-
ceding discussion demonstrates, in many jurisdictions, it is evidentiary 
doctrine that is "unmoored" from its underlying principles to reflect 
prevailing presumptions about domestic violence; courts and legisla-
tures justify the adaptation of fairness-based rules by appealing to reli-
ability principles (as in domestic violence propensity exceptions), or 
by redefining what is "equitable" in the context of domestic violence 
(as in the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception), and/or by eschewing 
engagement with underlying reliability principles altogether (as in the 
medical treatment and diagnosis hearsay exception). 
This evidentiary unmooring is hardly inconsequential. Evidence 
introduced under these specialized rules can be so persuasive it may 
be dispositive. For example, empirical studies confirm that exposure 
to uncharged misconduct evidence "greatly increases the likelihood of 
a guilty verdict. "264 It is unsurprising, therefore, that prosecutors in 
jurisdictions with domestic violence propensity statutes reported that 
the statutes are "invaluable" in obtaining guilty pleas and verdicts265 
and "greatly strengthened [their] ability to prove their domestic vio-
261 Id. at 900. 
262 Id. 
263 Tuerkheimer, supra note 13, at 990. 
264 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Dispute over the Doctrine of Chances, 7 CRIM. JusT. 16, 
21 (1992). 
265 See Andrea M. Kovach, Prosecutorial Use of Other Acts of Domestic Violence for 
Propensity Purposes: A Brief Look at Its Past, Present, and Future, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1115, 1138, 1148 (citing to survey responses from prosecutors in Minnesota and California). 
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lence cases beyond a reasonable doubt."266 The case law supports this 
observation. In the Alaska case of Carter v. State, for example, the 
defendant was charged with fourth-degree assault based on allega-
tions that he punched his wife.267 Through the application of the 
state's domestic violence propensity statute, the jury learned that he 
had assaulted her nine years before the charged incident and again 
five years before the charged incident.268 Acknowledging that the 
state's case against the defendant was otherwise weak, the Alaska 
Court of Appeals upheld admission of this evidence under the state's 
domestic violence propensity statute.26 9 
Similarly, the addition of the domestic violence context exception 
to an already malleable list of purportedly nonpropensity theories of 
admissibility for past bad acts can be immensely helpful to the prose-
cution. Generally, noncharacter theories of admissibility, such as 
motive or intent, depend on the theory of defense and therefore 
permit introduction of prior bad acts evidence only in rebuttal or if 
the defense "opens the door" to such evidence.270 Evidence of prior 
bad acts that is probative of the "domestic violence context," by con-
trast, is generally admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief, regard-
less of the theory of the defense. Moreover, studies substantiate that 
jurors use prior acts evidence admitted for a nonpropensity purpose 
for propensity reasoning, despite limiting instructions prohibiting 
them from doing so.271 The "nai"ve assumption" that limiting instruc-
tions could overcome these prejudicial effects is an "unmitigated fic-
tion. "272 Thus, by increasing the frequency with which prior bad acts 
are admitted in domestic violence prosecutions, the domestic violence 
context exception inevitably increases the frequency with which juries 
convict domestic violence defendants based on propensity reasoning. 
The specialization of the hearsay-related rules is also a substantial 
boon for prosecutors. Since statements that fall within the medical 
treatment and diagnosis hearsay exception are considered presump-
tively reliable, statements of identification made by a patient who 
266 Id. at 1143. 
267 No. A-10677, 2011WL3667222, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2011). 
268 Id. at *1-2. 
269 Id. at *3. 
270 Generally, a defendant may "take an issue ... out of a case" and, therefore, render 
the nonpropensity prior acts evidence irrelevant. United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 
1421-22 (2d Cir. 1993). In the Second Circuit, for example, a defendant may remove the 
issue of intent from a case by asserting that he did not commit a crime, as opposed to 
conceding that he did so, but innocently or mistakenly. Id. 
271 Imwinkelried, supra note 264, at 21. 
272 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) ("The naive assumption that 
prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, ... all practicing lawyers 
know to be unmitigated fiction." (citation omitted)). 
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reports domestic violence to her doctor are admissible even if she 
does not testify at trial,273 or if she testifies but recants her identifica-
tion.274 Moreover, dicta in Giles v. California strongly suggest that 
statements to medical providers are not testimonial and, therefore, a 
Confrontation Clause objection to such testimony would be futile.275 
This specialized exception, therefore, allows prosecutors to avoid 
calling a reluctant complainant altogether; instead, they can simply 
call the treating physician to recount her identification. On the other 
hand, since the forfeiture doctrine is based on principles of equity, 
rather than reliability, establishing forfeiture permits introduction of 
evidence that is patently unreliable, yet highly persuasive. 
IV 
THE HARMS OF EvrnENTIARY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
ExcEPTIONALISM 
Although the overriding purpose of a criminal trial is to deter-
mine the truth about an alleged criminal act,276 every criminal defen- ' 
dant is guaranteed a number of protections that preclude the 
collection or introduction of evidence many consider essential to the 
truth-seeking process.277 While the criminal justice system undoubt-
edly values truthseeking, it also values fairness in addition to, and 
sometimes at the expense of, ascertaining truth.278 Thus, a criminal 
trial is properly understood not as a search for the absolute truth of an 
273 See, e.g., Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957, 960, 962 (Wyo. 2000) (admitting 
nontestifying patient's report to her doctor). 
274 See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 775 P.2d 342, 343 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (admitting report to 
doctor of patient who recanted). 
275 See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008) ("[O]nly testimonial statements are 
excluded by the Confrontation Clause .... [S]tatements to physicians in the course of 
receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules."). 
276 Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (explaining "the very nature of a trial as a 
search for truth"). 
277 See, e.g., Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (noting that, although the 
"basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth," the "Fifth Amendment's privilege 
against self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth," but nonetheless 
demands "undiluted respect"); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) 
("The overriding policy of excluding [character] evidence, despite its admitted probative 
value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, 
unfair surprise and undue prejudice."). 
278 Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060, 
1063-64 (1975) ("We are concerned, however, with far more than a search for truth, and 
the constitutional rights ... serve independent values that may well outweigh the truth-
seeking value, a fact made manifest when we realize that those rights, far from furthering 
the search for truth, may well impede it."). Of course this proposition is not without its 
critics. See Kenneth W. Starr, Speech, Truth and Truth-Telling, 30 TEx. TECH L. REv. 901, 
902-03 (1999) (summarizing debate between Alan Dershowitz and Akhil Reed Amar 
about whether truthseeking should be the goal of the criminal justice system). 
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event, but rather a search for a mitigated "courtroom truth,"279 a pro-
cess whereby a fact finder determines whether the state established 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged 
crime, through procedures and proof deemed fair-and just without 
regard for the nature of the underlying substantive allegations.280 
Evidence rules are crucial to the construction of this courtroom truth. 
They are "historically grounded rights" that protect the reasonable 
doubt standard and safeguard defendants "from dubious and unjust 
convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property. "281 
As demonstrated in Part II, however, many jurisdictions have 
manipulated evidence rules to shape the courtroom truth in domestic 
violence prosecutions to comport with the prevailing preconceptions 
about the dynamics of domestic violence. Rejecting transsubstantive 
evidence rules and standards, courts and legislatures reason that 
domestic violence is different and that this difference requires special-
ized evidence rules and standards. Although these are persuasive and 
effective weapons in the criminal justice-focused war against domestic 
violence, even when these tactics work, they nevertheless cause 
harm.282 
A. Legitimacy and Fairness Harms 
As recounted above, the dominance feminist account of domestic 
violence exceptionalism shapes evidentiary doctrine in many jurisdic-
tions. And, as will be discussed below, this account, both generally, 
and in its specific application to evidentiary doctrine, is detrimental to 
many complainants. But its employment to shape evidentiary doctrine 
279 John MacArthur Maguire & Robert C. Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation 
or Related Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226, 238 (1935) ("Courtroom truth is what a jury or the 
judge finds after full and fair presentation of evidence."). 
280 See Laura Berend, Less Reliable Preliminary Hearings and Plea Bargains in Criminal 
Cases in California: Discovery Before and After Proposition 115, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 465, 
468-69 (1998) (arguing the fusion of a variety of criminal justice system elements, 
"including evidentiary and procedural rules," achieves "a 'legal' truth that ultimately meets 
our current social expectations of 'fundamental fairness' or 'justice'" (citations omitted)). 
In New York State, parties and courts are prohibited from instructing a criminal jury that 
the trial is a "search for the truth," since doing so suggests the jury may convict if it 
concludes the verdict represents the "truth," even if the prosecution has not established 
proof thereof beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Ward, 966 N.Y.S.2d 805, 807 (App. 
Div. 2013) (concluding that "the prosecutor's characterization of the trial as a 'search for 
the truth' was indeed improper," though not finding a deprivation of a fair trial); People v. 
Jackson, 571 N.Y.S.2d 721, 724 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that prosecutor's comment that 
"a trial is 'the search for the truth'" impaired defendant's right to a fair trial). 
281 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949). 
282 See Capers, supra note 24, at 832 ("When rape shields do work, they do so at 
extraordinary cost, reinscribing the very chastity requirement that they were intended to 
abolish."). 
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also has troubling consequences for the legitimacy of the criminal jus-
tice system and individual defendants that have heretofore escaped 
critical analysis. 
As a preliminary matter, the assumptions about domestic vio-
lence that fuel the evidentiary manipulation recounted in Part II, 
namely that domestic violence occurs according to a universal pattern 
and is inflicted on a person who is unable, because of the abuse, to 
leave the relationship, are empirically unfounded. This narrative ema-
nates from psychological studies conducted by Lenore Walker, whose 
work has been roundly critiqued as methodologically flawed. 283 For 
example, the data set upon which Walker based her cycle of violence 
theory consisted of the stories of 120 battered women, "fragments" of 
other stories, and interviews of people who "offered their services to 
battered women."284 Walker used no control group to test her cycle of 
violence hypotheses, employed flawed interview tactics to gather her 
data, and, most troublingly, drew conclusions unsupported by her own 
data; only approximately thirty-eight percent of the women she inter-
viewed actually experienced all three of the phases that the study 
identified and from which Walker drew the "cycle of violence" 
theory.285 
The learned helplessness theory stands on even shakier method-
ological footing. 286 The theory was originally developed by psycholo-
gist Martin Seligman to explain why dogs repeatedly subjected to 
electrical shocks in a laboratory experiment remained in their cages, 
even when they were permitted egress.287 Applying this theory to bat-
tered women, Walker concluded that they did not leave their abusive 
relationships because, like the dogs in Seligman's study, they believed 
resistance was futile.288 Yet, in drawing this comparison, Walker over-
looked a glaring mismatch between this theory and her data: Many of 
the women she interviewed did not express helplessness, but rather 
felt that they were in control of what happened to them; many 
283 See GoooMARK, supra note 5, at 61 (summarizing critiques of Walker's studies). 
284 WALKER, supra note 42, at xiii. 
285 David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of 
Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 67, 77-78 (1997) (identifying five methodological flaws in the 
study upon which Lenore Walker built the cycle of violence theory and explaining how 
they came to the thirty-eight percent figure). 
286 See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 81-83 (1994) 
(critiquing Walker's application of learned helplessness to battered women); Myrna S. 
Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome by and 
Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. CoLo. L. REv. 789, 798 
(1996) (noting "general agreement that learned helplessness has its limitations," and 
discussing alternative research finding that complainants can and do seek help). 
287 See WALKER, supra note 42, at 45-46 (describing Seligman's experiment). 
288 Id. at 46-50. 
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reported that they "analyze what is necessary to control the batterers' 
behavior, develop a plan-which may include leaving the batterer-
and attempt to carry it out," even if they are not successful.289 
Because of its obfuscation of women's strategic resistance to violence, 
learned helplessness and battered woman syndrome have been thor-
oughly critiqued as disempowering complainants by "emphasiz[ing] 
the disabling effects of violence rather than women's survival 
skills."290 Moreover, the concept of learned helplessness is fundamen-
tally incompatible with the question it purported to answer: why some 
battered women respond violently to their abusers-the antithesis of a 
learned helplessness response-instead of ending the relationship. 
The point to be drawn from these critiques is not that domestic 
violence never comports with prevailing stereotypes; undoubtedly, the 
experiences of some people who experience domestic violence com-
port with this narrative, even though it has not been rigorously empiri-
cally validated.291 The point, rather, is that not all, and possibly not 
even most, domestic violence occurs according to an escalating pat-
tern that renders the complainant unwilling and unable to respond. 
Once it is acknowledged that the cycle of violence and learned 
helplessness theories do not embody an accurate, universalized 
description of domestic violence, the most explicit justifications for 
why domestic violence offenses require specialized rules fall away. 
What remains is the need-based justification, namely, that specialized 
and more permissive evidence rules are necessary because domestic 
violence offenses are notoriously difficult to prosecute. The special-
ized rules, therefore, are an attempt to compensate for the difficulty of 
proving and punishing allegations of domestic violence. But manipu-
lating evidence rules to circumvent evidentiary difficulties in proving 
guilt represents an aberration in an adjudicatory system that purports 
to also uphold values beyond the simple ascertainment of truth,292 and 
289 Shelby A.D. Moore, Battered Woman Syndrome: Selling the Shadow to Support the 
Substance, 38 How. L.J. 297, 318 (1995); see Coughlin, supra note 286, at 82 (describing 
how Walker's analysis fails to account for key features of the Seligman study that discredit 
her "crude comparison between the psychology of battered women and caged dogs"); 
Melanie Randall, Domestic Violence and the Construction of "Ideal Victims": Assaulted 
Women's "Image Problems" in Law, 23 ST. LOUIS U. Pus. L. REv. 107, 124 (2004) 
("Research with women assaulted by their male partners has consistently demonstrated 
that women employ a range of creative ways through which they attempt to escape, avoid, 
minimize, or stop the violence against them."). 
290 Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to 
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 1000 (1995). 
291 See Raeder, supra note 286, at 797 ("[D]espite the problems of well-defined proof, 
there is massive anecdotal evidence generally confirming [battered woman syndrome]."). 
292 See Tehan v. United States. 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (noting that. although the "basic 
purpose of a trial is the determination of truth," the "Fifth Amendment's privilege against 
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which errs on the side of protecting the innocent even if doing so 
comes at the expense of punishing the guilty.293 It sets us down a slip-
pery slope toward the consequentialist manipulation of evidence rules 
in other contexts, raising a number of troubling systemic questions. If 
we are willing to manipulate evidentiary doctrine to give the prosecu-
tion an advantage in domestic violence cases, why stop there? Why 
not extend this reasoning to other crimes that are difficult to prose-
cute, like organized crime offenses? This begs yet another question: If 
we are going to manipulate evidentiary doctrine to facilitate convic-
tion, what is the purpose of a trial? 
Furthermore, the decoupling of evidence rules from their justifi-
catory roots to reflect the prevailing stereotypes about domestic vio-
lence is unfair to defendants. It modifies the rules-in advance of a 
trial at which an allegation of domestic violence will be adjudicated-
to reflect the presumption that certain behavioral patterns on the part 
of the defendant and complainant are highly suggestive of the defen-
dant's guilt of the charged offense. Since this narrative presumes a 
batterer, the rules are changed to depict the defendant as always and 
already guilty, as someone whose bad past dictates his present 
behavior and has impacted the complainant in a way that leaves her 
unable to meaningfully participate in the prosecutorial process. As 
such, these rules unfairly undermine the presumption of innocence 
and compromise the reasonable doubt standard.294 
Some may respond that we are not heading down a slippery slope 
toward the dismantling of a transsubstantive evidentiary code, nor 
treating defendants unfairly, but rather carving out targeted and lim-
ited exceptions that simply rebalance the scales of justice for victims 
of domestic violence.295 Applying traditional evidence rules in these 
cases, the argument goes, is unfair to complainants and society 
because doing so allows batterers to escape punishment, leaving them 
self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth," but nonetheless 
demands "undiluted respect"). 
293 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I view the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a 
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent 
man than to let a guilty man go free."). 
294 For an extensive analysis of the fundamental fairness and constitutional implications 
of vitiating the propensity ban for defendants accused of sex offenses and child molestation 
after the passage of FED. R. Evm. 413-415, which applies equally to domestic violence 
defendants, see Natali & Stigall, supra note 97, at 23-34, and also see Jeffrey G. Pickett, 
The Presumption of Innocence Imperiled: The New Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 and 
the Use of Other Sexual-Offense Evidence in Washington, 70 WASH. L. REv. 883, 899-902 
(1995) (arguing that Rules 413-415 undermine the presumption of innocence). 
295 See sources cited supra notes 17-18. 
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free to commit future acts of violence.296 Implicit in this argument is 
the normative presumption that criminalization is an ideal and effec-
tive response to every act of domestic violence. As the next section 
demonstrates, this presumption is false. 
B. Instrumental Harms 
The dominance feminist iteration of domestic violence exception-
alism was politically palatable because it provided a straightforward 
explanation of this complex problem that led to an equally straightfor-
ward policy: a universal criminal justice response to reports of 
domestic violence. The specialization of evidentiary doctrine that 
occurs in domestic violence prosecutions is the latest step-following 
mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies-in this larger 
project of advancing a strong, criminalization-focused response to 
domestic violence.291 
In the decades that have passed since the state began to take 
domestic violence seriously, however, it has become increasingly clear 
that this myopic focus on criminal justice responses to domestic vio-
lence is neither an effective nor sufficient solution for many complain-
ants. It is undeniable that mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution 
policies-the pillars of the criminalization model-have increased the 
number of arrests for and prosecutions of domestic violence 
offenses.298 Yet data is, at best, "mixed" as to whether these strategies 
have increased victim safety.299 Many studies indicate that mandatory 
arrest practices have an insignificant effect on victim safety, and some 
suggest they actually escalate violence300 and can increase the likeli-
hood of recidivism.301 Similarly, the use of no-drop prosecution 
296 See sources cited supra note 18. 
297 See Lisa Goodman & Deborah Epstein, Refocusing on Women: A New Direction for 
Policy and Research on Intimate Partner Violence, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 479, 
479 (2005) ("The bulk of recently adopted ... criminal justice reforms [targeting domestic 
violence J have taken the form of relatively inflexible, one-size-fits-all mandatory responses 
focused on counseling, restraining, and punishing batterers to prevent them from 
reoffending."). 
298 See Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case 
but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 191, 217-18, 224-25 (2008) 
(summarizing studies demonstrating large increases in domestic violence arrests and 
decreases in the dismissal of domestic violence prosecutions). 
299 See Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence 
Law: A Critical Review, 4 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 801, 815 {2001) (summarizing the finding of 
a National Institute of Justice study of the deterrent effect of arrest as having "at best a 
modest and short-lived deterrent effect"); Kohn, supra note 298, at 237-38 (summarizing 
research on the effect of no-drop prosecution policies on victim safety and recidivism). 
300 See Kohn, supra note 298, at 235-36 (summarizing studies). 
301 Lawrence W. Sherman et al., 57 AM. Soc. REv. 680, 680 (1992), cited in Coker, supra 
note 299, at 815 {2001). 
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polices over the complainant's objection increases the risk of future 
abuse in some cases.302 Thus, while compulsory criminal justice inter-
vention may increase the safety of some women, it is an ineffective-
and perhaps dangerous-response for others.303 
The criminalization model not only provides a universalized 
response that does not work for some, but also problematically rein-
forces the dominance feminist conception of a universalized com-
plainant: one who wants and is willing to invoke the criminal justice 
apparatus to end her abusive relationship.304 But, as anti-essentialist 
feminist theorists have emphasized, "there is no unitary women's 
experience."305 The criminalization model overlooks the ways in 
which factors such as race, class, sexual orientation, and citizenship 
status impact a complainant's willingness to call on the criminal justice 
system and participate in the state-mandated separation that so often 
results from such intervention. For example, as Kimberle Crenshaw 
has underscored, women of color "are often reluctant to call the 
police, a hesitancy likely due to a general unwillingness among people 
of color to subject their private lives to the scrutiny and control of a 
police force that is frequently hostile."306 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender individuals, whose communities have also been histori-
302 See Kohn, supra note 298, at 237-38 (summarizing studies). One explanation for this 
phenomenon is offered by research that suggests "battered women who oppose arrest and 
prosecution because they predict it will result in further violence are often accurate in their 
assessment." Coker, supra note 299, at 818. 
303 See RICHIE, supra note 14, at 3-4 (arguing that "there is evidence that some women 
are safer in 2012 than they were 25 years ago" as a result of the criminalization of domestic 
violence, but "women with less power"-particularly black women-are "in as much 
danger as ever"); Kohn, supra note 298, at 235 ("Most [studies] suggest that, while some 
victims may be at a decreased risk of re-abuse under a mandatory intervention regime, the 
policies tend to have an insignificant effect on victim safety and may even put some victims 
at increased risk."). Ironically, "the overall impact of mandatory arrest laws for domestic 
violence have [sic] led to decreases in the number of battered women who kill their 
partners in self-defense, but they have not led to a decrease in the number of batterers who 
kill their partners." Critical Resistance & Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, 
Gender Violence and the Prison-Industrial Complex, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE 
INCITE! ANTHOLOGY 223, 223 (Incite! Women of Color Against Violence ed. 2006). 
304 Beth E. Richie calls this the "everywoman analysis" and describes "everywoman" as 
"a white, middle-class woman who can turn to a counselor, a doctor, a police officer, or a 
lawyer to protect her from abuse." RICHIE, supra note 14, at 89-92. 
305 GoODMARK, supra note 5, at 4. In the context of domestic violence law and policy, 
"[a]nti-essentialist feminist theory prompts questions about why the law defines domestic 
violence as it does and whose interests are protected (and whose ignored)" and "rejects the 
notion that one set of solutions is appropriate for every woman subjected to abuse ... . "Id. 
at 5. 
306 Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: lntersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1257 (1991). 
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cally oversurveilled, may similarly hesitate to invoke the state's police 
power in response to domestic violence.301 
Furthermore, the universalized complainant is one who wants to 
and can sever all ties with her abusive partner. Yet, many remain 
dependent on their abusive partners for many reasons, including 
financial, familial, or emotional support; they may decide, for those 
reasons, that pursuing prosecution is not in their best interests. While 
prosecuting the batterer under such circumstances may lead to a crim-
inal justice "success," such an approach overlooks how and why such a 
result may represent a failure for the complainant. For example, it 
does nothing to address the financial difficulties the complainant may 
face if the defendant is incarcerated or the gaps in child care that may 
result from his absence.3os 
Although it is becoming increasingly clear that a compulsory 
criminal justice response is not a "one size fits all" solution to the 
complex social problem of domestic violence, state actors continue to 
pursue this myopic criminalization agenda. The development of spe-
cialized evidence rules is part of the larger project of forcing allega-
tions of abuse to "fit" into the criminal justice system. They enable 
prosecutors to circumvent evidentiary gaps created by the com-
plainant's absence, or undermine the testimony of complainants who 
testify unfavorably to the prosecution. The domestic violence context 
exception, for example, authorizes admission of evidence of prior acts 
of abuse to undermine the credibility of a recanting complainant and 
depict the relationship as eternally abusive.309 The medical treatment 
and diagnosis exception allows prosecutors to substitute a medical 
provider's testimony recounting the complainant's allegations for the 
complainant's in-court testimony.310 And developments in the forfei-
ture by wrongdoing exception increasingly enable courts to find the 
307 See Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of 
Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 37 (2009) 
(recounting reasons why lesbians may hesitate to "engage the criminal justice system" in 
response to domestic violence). 
308 Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and 
Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1009, 1017-18 (2000) ("[S]eparation may 
create catastrophic results for poor women. Separation threatens women's tenuous hold on 
economic viability, for without the batterer's income or his assistance with childcare, for 
example, women may lose jobs, housing, and even their children."). 
309 See supra Part Il.A.2 (recounting the consequences of the domestic violence context 
exception). 
3!0 See supra Part II.B (discussing the medical treatment and diagnosis exception in the 
domestic violence context). 
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defendant responsible for the complainant's refusal to testify, even 
when she affirmatively refutes such a conclusion.311 
Thus, the manipulation of evidence rules to reflect the dominance 
feminist iteration of domestic violence exceptionalism facilitates an 
ineffective universalized response mechanism. The conclusion to be 
drawn from this observation, however, is not that the criminal justice 
system has no role to play in responding to domestic violence. That 
police and prosecutors now take domestic violence seriously is an 
accomplishment, not a cause for concern. The problem, rather, is that 
the state presents the criminal justice system in "isolation from other 
possible responses," as the sole response mechanism for addressing 
domestic violence, instead of as "part of a menu of options for women 
who are harmed by male violence. "312 Emerging research suggests 
that "responding flexibly to victims' needs and providing them with 
advocacy and broad social support could be a more successful strategy 
for eliminating domestic violence" than criminal justice responses.313 
Yet, as a result of this criminalization myopia, we have lost sight of 
alternative, extracriminal responses that may be more desirable for 
some complainants and more effective for some defendants.314 
C. Rhetorical Harms 
The evidentiary manipulation that occurs in domestic violence 
prosecutions also causes a less functional, but equally troubling, harm: 
It rhetorically reinscribes the disempowering image of the "true 
victim" on those who resist state intervention. "True victims" are the 
embodiment of learned helplessness;315 they are "entirely helpless" 
and refuse to cooperate because they are "paralyzed by fear."316 
311 See supra Part Il.C (discussing the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception in the 
domestic violence context). 
312 RICHIE, supra note 14, at 163. 
313 Goodman & Epstein, supra note 297, at 480 (citation omitted); see id. at 484 
(summarizing research). 
314 See Goodmark, supra note 5, at 157 ("Reliance on the law has preempted creative 
thinking about other ways to assist women subjected to abuse and diminished the 
possibility of partnership with communities who are unwilling to increase state 
intervention into their members' lives."). Scholars have proposed many alternative 
responses. See, e.g., GoooMARK, supra note 5, at 178-94 (summarizing proposals for 
responding to domestic violence "beyond the law," including forming community-based 
truth commissions, establishing economic security for people subjected to abuse, and 
working with men who abuse to change their behavior); RICHIE, supra note 14, at 163 
(advocating for the involvement of non-law enforcement actors who may influence an 
offender's behavior, such as faith leaders or family members). 
315 Hanna, supra note 12, at 1883 ("Women who do not want to proceed are 
characterized either as agents in the battering-allowing it to continue because of their 
lack of cooperation with the state-or as true victims who have 'learned helplessness.'"). 
316 Randall, supra note 289, at 145. 
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The specialized evidence rules are crafted to reflect only those 
traits that comport with this stereotype of domestic violence com-
plainants as "passive, dependent, weak, and afraid."317 The expanded 
medical hearsay and treatment exception, for example, reflects the 
paternalistic rationale that adult domestic violence complainants, like 
abused children, are unable to make independent, rational decisions 
about how to prevent future harm. And jurisdictions that are willing 
to infer that the defendant caused the complainant's unavailability-
over her objection-insist that the only reason a complainant would 
become "unavailable" is because she is afraid of her abuser or has 
succumbed completely to his coercive control. In this way, the com-
plainant becomes an agent of the defendant, unable to form an 
opinion independent of his influence.318 Similarly, by allowing the jury 
to consider past acts of abuse in assessing a recanting complainant's 
credibility, courts signal that her recantation is not a result of indepen-
dent and rational decision making, but rather the inescapable psycho-
logical byproduct of abuse. In these ways, specialized rules work as a 
one-way ratchet that recirculates the universalized image of battered 
women to enable admission of evidence that is consistent with convic-
tion, and to silence that which is not. 
/J. /l,fjicacy llarrns 
The manipulation of evidence rules imposes a final cost that 
should give pause even to those who continue to support the criminal-
ization model: It may impede the efficacy of the criminal justice inter-
vention altogether. Procedural justice studies demonstrate that the 
way in which defendants experience the criminal justice system is a 
significant factor in predicting future behavior. The experience of 
being treated fairly by an authority figure-even during a sanctioning 
process-legitimates that authority and increases one's satisfaction 
with the outcome of that process, even if the outcome is not 
favorable. 319 Outcome satisfaction, in turn, correlates positively with 
317 See GoonMARK, supra note 5, at 76 (discussing this stereotype in the context of 
domestic violence trainings). 
318 This practice thus invokes the specter of coverture, under which a woman was 
assumed to be "one" with her husband. See Siegel, supra note 25, at 2122-23 (discussing 
the nineteenth century doctrine of marital unity). 
319 See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 165 (1990) (outlining the impact 
of procedural fairness on outcome satisfaction); Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: 
Tempering the State's Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1843, 
1878-80 (2002) (summarizing procedural justice studies and concluding that "extensive 
data, obtained in a wide variety of contexts" reveals a "strong link" between "one's 
perceptions of fair treatment and one's attitude toward authority"). One study showed that 
the extent to which felony defendants felt criminal justice system actors treated them fairly 
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future compliance with authority.32° For example, study of the impact 
of arrest on recidivism in domestic violence cases revealed that defen-
dants who felt the police treated them fairly during the arrest proce-
dures demonstrated a "significantly lower" recidivism rate than those 
arrested pursuant to processes perceived as unfair.321 Procedural jus-
tice was so significant that those who were arrested, but felt that they 
were treated fairly, recidivated at a rate that approximated those who 
achieved the more "favorable" outcome of being warned and released 
without arrest.322 
The application of specialized evidence rules undermines many of 
the "building blocks of procedural justice," particularly neutrality, 
process control, and consistency.323 Specialized rules-based as they 
are upon the presumptively cyclical nature of domestic violence-
undermine the appearance of neutrality by conveying that the court 
has presumed the defendant's guilt from his past behavior. This 
impression that the court has prejudged guilt and will adapt the evi-
dence rules to reflect that judgment suggests to defendants that their 
version of events is insignificant, or that their input is irrelevant to the 
process by which guilt is adjudicated. Accordingly, such evidentiary 
manipulation undermines a defendant's sense of "process control," or 
the impression that he has a "genuine opportunity to state his case 
and that his needs are being treated as a matter of concem."324 
Finally, as discussed above, specialized domestic violence evidence 
rules emanate from the presumption that domestic violence is sub-
"substantially influenced" their satisfaction with the outcome of their criminal proceedings. 
Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAw & Soc'v REv. 483, 
503 (1988). 
320 See Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of 
Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAw & Soc'v REv. 163, 169 (1997) ("[T]he use of 
fair procedures facilitates the development of perceptions that authorities are both 
legitimate and moral. Once the perception that legal authorities are legitimate has been 
shaped, compliance with the law is enhanced, even when it conflicts with one's immediate 
self-interest."). Procedural justice thus challenges a central tenet of deterrence theory, 
namely that an individual's self-interest is the only factor considered in assessing outcome 
satisfaction. Epstein, supra note 319, at 1874-75. Alternatively, some proponents of 
procedural justice take an instrumentalist position, consistent with deterrence theory, that 
procedural justice matters because fair procedures lead to fair outcomes, and fair outcomes 
inspire compliance. Id. at 1875; Paternoster et al., supra at 165. 
321 Paternoster et al., supra note 320, at 163. 
322 Id. 
323 See Epstein, supra note 319, at 1876-77 (identifying the "building blocks of 
procedural justice" as trust or "process control," neutrality, consistency, and dignity). 
324 Id. at 1876. Commentators have referred to this factor as "representation" and 
explain, "[w]hile disputing parties may not feel that they have the right to determine the 
outcome, it is important to their sense of fairness that they be given the opportunity to 
present their case to authorities and that their opinions be given consideration." 
Paternoster et al., supra note 320, at 167. 
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stantively "different" from other crimes of violence and, in fact, many 
courts specify this "difference" as the primary justification for their 
permissive evidence rulings.325 This explicit acknowledgement that 
prosecutors can introduce evidence in domestic violence prosecutions 
that would be inadmissible but for the identity of the parties conveys 
to domestic violence defendants that the evidence against them is 
assessed according to a different, and more permissive, standard than 
that used against other defendants. In so doing, this evidentiary 
manipulation can undermine the defendant's sense of consistency by 
conveying that courts are not treating all defendants equally.326 
Domestic violence defendants may become aware of this eviden-
tiary manipulation in many ways, including through explanations by 
· the court or their attorneys about the basis for the rulings or through 
their own independent knowledge of the legal system. Some undoubt-
edly will point out that defendants may not become aware of legal 
rulings because defense attorneys and/or courts are too overburdened 
to keep defendants apprised of legal rulings about the admissibility of 
evidence. As a normative matter, courts and attorneys should be 
encouraged to keep a defendant informed about all possibly disposi-
tive developments in his case. As a practical matter, keeping a defen-
dant in the dark may further reduce his sense of procedural justice.327 
325 See, e.g., State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004) (noting that the court 
has treated evidence of prior abusive acts in the context of an intimate relationship 
"differently" than it does other types of abuse, and concluding that this "different 
treatment is appropriate in the context of the accused and the alleged victim of domestic 
abuse"); People v. Benston, 942 N.E.2d 210, 215-16 (N.Y. 2010) (concluding that domestic 
violence "differs materially, ... from other types of assault" and relying on this difference 
to justify admitting doctor's statement diagnosing the complainant with "domestic 
violence"). 
326 See TYLER, supra note 319, at 118-19 ("Consistency refers to similarity of treatment 
and outcomes. Consistency toward people generally takes the form of equal treatment for 
all affected parties."). For example, to illustrate the concept of consistency, Tyler uses the 
example of a baseball game, in which an "umpire should define the same strike zone for all 
players." Id. In the evidentiary context, consistency requires that the court applies the 
same rules equally to every defendant. See Paternoster et al., supra note 320, at 168 ("To 
the extent that legal authorities provide equal and invariant treatment, citizens are more 
likely to view their experiences in a positive light, perceive authorities as moral and 
legitimate, and comply with rules."). 
327 See Epstein, supra note 319, at 1892-95 (suggesting increasing both communication 
with defense attorneys and explanation of the trial process from the judge as strategies for 
increasing procedural justice in domestic violence prosecutions); Tom R. Tyler & Justin 
Sevier. How do the Courts Create Popular Legitimacy?: The Role of Establishing the Truth, 
Punishing Justly, and/or Acting Through Just Procedures, 77 ALB. L. REv. 1095, 1116-17 
(2014) (arguing that authorities communicate trustworthiness-and increase procedural 
legitimacy-by "explaining what the procedures they are using are and why they are 
making the decisions they do"). 
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This evidentiary specialization can also diminish the com-
plainant's sense of procedural justice. Research indicates that a com-
plainant who feels that government officials have listened to her story 
and are responsive to ·her individual needs is more likely to feel that 
· she has been treated fairly and more likely to cooperate with the pros-
ecution than one who feels "forced into a mandatory model dismissive 
of her input. "328 The use of specialized evidence rules to pursue prose-
cution against the complainant's wishes conveys that the com-
plainant's unique and informed perspective about the appropriate 
response to this complicated event is irrelevant, and that the state 
knows better than she about how to best prevent future violence. This 
dismissal of her input and insight not only reduces the likelihood that 
the she will cooperate with the prosecution, but also decreases the 
likelihood that she will enlist the assistance of criminal justice authori-
ties to address subsequent incidents of domestic violence.329 
Thus, procedural justice insights suggest that even if evidentiary 
manipulation facilitates a "successful" outcome (i.e. conviction), the 
use of unfair processes that are unresponsive both to the defendant 
and complainant's input in order to achieve that result decreases the 
likelihood that a defendant will abstain from future violence. In other 
words, it is not just that the ends do not justify the means, but also that 
the means may impede the desired end. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article does not contest that domestic violence is excep-
tional; it is undeniably exceptional in the depth and breadth of its 
destruction, its diversity of causes and effects, and its proven resis-
tance to a singular solution. And yet, the evidentiary manipulation 
recounted above reflects a narrow and singular exceptionalism-
namely, that which emerged from dominance feminist theory, was 
reified by early psychological studies of battered women, and quickly 
gained traction with those empowered to set domestic violence law 
and policy. As argued above, extending into the adjudicatory realm 
this restrictive vision of what differentiates domestic violence from 
other crimes undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system 
and is unfair not only to defendants, but also to complainants whose 
experiences do not comport with the prevailing narrative. 
328 Goodman & Epstein, supra note 297, at 482 (citation omitted). 
329 See Epstein, supra note 319, at 1891-92 (summarizing study finding that when 
prosecutors were unresponsive to domestic violence complainants, the complainants were 
unlikely to report subsequent assaults). 
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Crafting rules to reflect our presumptions about the character of 
a particular crime and its perpetrators and victims-as opposed to our 
judgments about what evidence is fair and reliable-sets us on the 
slippery slope toward the selective dismantling of our outcome-
neutral evidentiary code. The conclusion to be drawn from this anal-
ysis, however, is not that the experience of prosecuting domestic vio-
lence cases has nothing to teach us about our evidence rules. The 
unique evidentiary hurdles in domestic violence prosecutions may 
indicate that our rules require revision. But any resultant changes to 
evidentiary rules should reflect shifting conclusions about the princi-
ples behind the rules themselves, not presumptions about the char-
acter of a particular crime. Such an approach would be more honest, 
fair, and, ultimately, less harmful than recirculating restrictive ideas 
about what domestic violence is-or is not. 
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